Opinion India wants to be Vishwaguru. That will need Indian ideas
States that invent frameworks shape what others can imagine as options. Consider George Kennan’s “containment”, Joseph Nye’s “soft power”, or Albert Hirschman’s ideas on development
India stands at a fork. It can remain a skilled consumer of external frameworks, adapting competently but always on someone else’s map. Or it can produce concepts that others must cite, contest, and live with. Strengthening the ecosystem for ideas is central to atmanirbharta. 
India often speaks of becoming a Vishwaguru. A global teacher and thought leader. Yet, global influence is never won with slogans. True leadership comes from ideas, frameworks, and theories others must use. Britain did not dominate the world merely through fleets. It exported a liberal political economy. The US did not lead solely through military and economic power; it advanced realism and liberal institutionalism. Today, China promotes concepts like tianxia and digital sovereignty as alternatives to Western universals. Nations that define the terms of debate shape what others can imagine as possible. India too often walks in carrying other people’s ideas.
This is not a talent problem. India has a rich intellectual heritage and a large, English-speaking elite. Think of Aryabhata and Bhaskara, whose work in mathematics and astronomy influenced global knowledge; or Chanakya, whose Arthashastra codified statecraft, economics, and diplomacy. Jagadish Chandra Bose, C V Raman, and Satyendra Nath Bose shaped scientific thought worldwide. The problem lies in the ecosystem. Universities chase publication counts over conceptual impact. Interdisciplinary work remains a career risk. Think tanks churn out policy briefs for news cycles. Media rewards certainty, not patient reflection. Bureaucracies optimise procedure, not enduring frameworks. Without an ecosystem that prizes deep thinking, India remains a consumer of frameworks invented elsewhere.
India’s military often operates on doctrines suited for other nations’ realities. When India “does” foreign policy, it mostly works within imported frames — realism, liberalism, deterrence, or constructivism. These frameworks dictate what states count as rational and who counts on the global stage. Consider George Kennan’s “containment”, Joseph Nye’s “soft power”, or Albert Hirschman’s ideas on development. India today often reacts; it rarely redesigns the board. Even in forums like BRICS or the Quad, India demonstrates competence, not conceptual leadership.
The 21st century is turning on technology and data. India has leverage: Over a billion users, rapidly growing digital infrastructure, and a reputation as a stable democracy. Yet if the vocabulary remains imported, from Silicon Valley, Brussels, or Geneva, India remains a consumer of norms. Questions around digital sovereignty, privacy, and ethical AI are opportunities to define legitimacy in a networked world.
Vishwaguru is not a title claimed on stage. It is a pattern in citations, syllabi, and policy documents. Influence begins not with applause, but with argument. That requires patient statecraft, long-term investment in research, open debate, and tolerance for dissent. India stands at a fork. It can remain a skilled consumer of external frameworks, adapting competently but always on someone else’s map. Or it can produce concepts that others must cite, contest, and live with. Strengthening the ecosystem for ideas is central to atmanirbharta.
The writer is an Indian Army veteran and former advisor to the Ministry of Home Affairs
Share
