Opinion India’s post-Gaddafi world

Nearly nine months after joining the UNSC,the much anticipated geopolitical élan of a rising power has been replaced by the image of a profoundly ambivalent power.

India abstained when the UNSC authorised the use of force in Libya last March. Delhi also sat on the fence when the United Nations Human Rights Council condemned the Syrian government’s human rights violations a few days ago. Delhi’s unwillingness to line up against dictatorial rulers in the Middle East and its tendency to abstain in the UN forums has disappointed many quarters — at home and abroad.

How can Delhi construct a different and more credible approach to the historic political transformation under way in the Middle East? Delivering the Prem Bhatia Memorial lecture in the capital a few days ago,National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon talked down the domestic and international chatter on India’s “rise” and its “responsible” global role. Menon pointed to the many constraints — the nature of our domestic politics and the lack of strategic resources — on India’s ability to define the outcomes in the Middle East.

Recognising one’s own limitations is the first step in the construction of any credible international policy. In any case,India’s voting pattern in the UNSC is not an exceptional one. Through much of the 1990s,China and Russia,permanent members of the UN Security Council tended to abstain rather than contest the Western primacy in the Middle East.

Despite Russia’s more assertive foreign policy and China’s rising clout in recent years,neither Moscow nor Beijing have been able to alter the terms of the current UNSC debate on the Middle East. Within the confines of a hard-headed realism,India must necessarily find ways to raise its profile in the Middle East and the international discourse on it in the UN. After all,the region is home to millions of Indian expatriates,the main source of energy and hard currency remittances,and a big market for Indian exports.

A more active policy in the Middle East does not mean that India simply tails the West. Being a “responsible power” does not mean voting with the Western powers every time they choose to intervene in the Middle East. After all,Western policy is not driven by altruism and is riddled with many contradictions.

At the same time,India can’t rely on the knee-jerk Third Worldism of the past. There is no consensus today,either within the non-aligned movement or the Middle East,on the issues confronting the region.

On the UN Human Rights Council Resolution condemning Syria,Indonesia — one of the founders of the NAM,the world’s largest Muslim nation,and a leading democracy — voted for the move. Of the five Arab members of the Council,Saudi Arabia,Jordan,Kuwait and Qatar joined the West in criticising Syria. Only Mauritania abstained.

The only consistent principle that matters for India is the relentless pursuit of national interest. In the past,India could afford to frame its policy towards the Middle East in terms of a broad set of principles. That was alright when India was largely marginal to the regional politics of the Middle East. Today,as India’s interests continue to grow there,and the region confronts change after decades of stability,Delhi needs a more flexible regional policy that sheds the old shibboleths.

The old rhetoric about “Arab Solidarity” or opposition to foreign intervention in the Middle East makes no sense when Arab states are drawn against each other,and many states in the region are actively intervening in the affairs of others. India’s policy in the Middle East can no longer be a prisoner to such notions as state sovereignty or non-intervention. In international politics,all high principles make sense only in a particular context.

As people seek representative governments,minorities — sectarian,religious,and ethnic — seek their rights,and majorities seek to overthrow prolonged rule by minorities,many deep conflicts in the Middle East are boiling over.

Many regional actors,including Saudi Arabia,Iran and Turkey,are locked in a fierce contest to shape the regional order even as the West seeks to retain its regional primacy. Where does this leave Indian policy to the Middle East? Four propositions stand out.

One,what Delhi says in the United Nations must reflect India’s interests in the Middle East,rather than the past voting behaviour in the UN. After all,multilateralism is not an end in itself,but only an instrument of national strategy.

Two,what India does in the Middle East is far more important than how it votes in the UN. Delhi’s attitude to internal struggles within the nations of the Middle East must be guided by assessments of the durability of regimes,the ideological and political orientation of the opposition,and the impact of internal change on India’s interests.

Three,as the region’s internal and external balance begins to evolve rapidly,India must expand its consultations with all the great powers and regional actors. That is only one necessary part of a broader Indian regional strategy in the Middle East.

Finally,India can no longer limit itself to dealing with just Middle Eastern governments. Amidst great transformation of the Middle East,India must develop the capabilities to engage the many new political forces emerging in the region. For some in the opposition today are bound to become the rulers in the not-too-distant future.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research,Delhi