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Opinion India and China need each other. But will the detente last?

Three drivers of India-China détente are economic, military, and political. These will likely be even stronger triggers now that Trump is at the helm in Washington

India and China face a common challenge — how to enhance their bargaining power with the US. (Source: File)

January 30, 2025 02:10 PM IST First published on: Jan 30, 2025 at 06:57 AM IST

India and China are finally talking to each other again rather than past each other. Are we, then, headed back to their pre-Galwan “normal” relationship, or is the present thaw likely to turn cold and conflictual again? Nothing in India-China relations is ever simple and linear, but the signs are that the two countries are moving towards the normal diplomacy of the past 35 years, ever since Rajiv Gandhi’s breakthrough trip to Beijing in 1988.

From 1988 onwards, India-China relations came to rest on four pillars that undergirded a fair degree of military and diplomatic stability: Summitry, border negotiations, confidence building measures (CBMs), and people-to-people (P2P) ties including trade. Until Galwan, the top leadership of India and China would meet regularly, bilaterally and multilaterally, often more than once a year. Running parallel to summitry were the border negotiations. In one form or another, talks on a final territorial settlement have run for over 30 years, with few interruptions (a remarkable fact).

Since the two militaries could clash at the border, they had worked out a series of CBMs to reduce the risk of serious escalation — Galwan was the exception that proved the rule (fatalities were low). Beyond these state-to-state measures, Delhi and Beijing encouraged P2P — tourism, cultural and academic links, and trade — to anchor ties at the societal level as well. As a result, thousands of Indian students are in China getting relatively low-priced and high-quality education and are also getting to know their host country beyond the inflammatory headlines.

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At least three factors are driving India and China back to this normal diplomacy. In a piece I wrote for the Asia Peace Programme at the National University of Singapore before Donald Trump won the US presidential election, I suggested that the three drivers of détente are economic, military, and political. These will likely be even stronger drivers of India-China diplomacy now that Trump is at the helm in Washington.

Economically, India and China need each other. India’s economy is stubbornly stuck on a 30-year growth path of 7 per cent per annum. China’s economy is languishing at 5 per cent per annum and could further slow down. To grow, Indian businesses desperately need Chinese products including in many key areas like pharmaceuticals, electronics, and also infrastructure. As for Chinese businesses, they need to diversify in a world where Western protectionism against them is growing. Looking ahead, India is a potentially huge market for China.

Militarily, the two countries are in a stalemate. It is clear after Galwan that both sides are prepared to maintain huge military deployments in physically horrible environments to defend every inch of territory. But these take a huge toll on men, materiel, and money. More importantly, given the terrain and climate, neither side can likely ever win an outright victory on the border. Plus, both confront other military challenges.

India must always reckon with the possibility of conflict with Pakistan over cross-border terrorism, and worse still, a two-front war with China and Pakistan. For China, the main military concerns are in East Asia — war with Taiwan, with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and with the Philippines over the South China Sea. In each case, the US could become involved against China. Trump’s presidency could heighten President Xi Jinping’s concerns over the US’ presence and role in the region.

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Politically, both Delhi and Beijing must constantly worry about Washington. Despite all the bonhomie between India and the US, differences abound: Over immigration, trade, relations with Pakistan and Bangladesh, US commentary on India’s democratic record, American accusations over a putative Indian assassination plot, and Indian accusations of unchecked Sikh militant activity on US soil. Some of these worries may reduce with Trump in the White House, others such as immigration and trade could get worse. For China, the US’ weaponisation of trade and technology are likely to continue under Trump.

China must also worry about America’s “naming and shaming” of Beijing’s policies in Tibet and Xinjiang. In short, India and China face a common challenge — how to enhance their bargaining power with the US. One way is to signal to Washington that they have other strategic choices and partners if pushed too hard.

Will this détente last? India and China have squared off in a series of confrontations since 2010 — in 2013 (Depsang), 2014 (Chumar), 2015 (Burtse), 2017 (Doklam), 2020 (Galwan), and 2022 (Yangtse), with casualties in 2020 and 2022. It would be foolish to say that the present détente and normalisation is assured and that the two sides will avoid future clashes. Territorial quarrels are hard to manage and even harder to resolve because land (and water) is connected to sovereignty.

National identity and memories of colonialism and imperialism in both India and China make both societies very touchy about any challenges to sovereignty. As Manjari Chatterjee Miller of the University of Toronto suggested years ago, both sides have an enduring sense of victimhood. Resolution of the quarrel is possible, but it will take a huge bargain. A bargain is not beyond Modi and Xi, but neither leadership looks in a hurry.

The drivers of the current thaw in relations are structural. Economic need, military realities, and political worries over the US are long-term factors that won’t easily go away. India-China relations should, therefore, continue to soften and normalise even if a long-term border and strategic agreement appears difficult to achieve.

The writer is Wilmar Professor of Asian Studies and vice dean (Research and Development), Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore