Opinion After Trump-Xi ceasefire in Busan, here’s a to-do list for New Delhi

The atmosphere reinforced that impression. Donald Trump played to the cameras with his usual showmanship. Xi Jinping appeared distant, as if preoccupied. Chinese state media airbrushed the symbolism by referring to the location simply as “Busan” and cropping military visuals. This was a deliberate attempt to preserve the image of parity.

The outcomes followed the same pattern. China agreed to ease export controls on rare earth minerals, increase US soybean imports, cooperate on fentanyl precursor controls, and explore buying Alaskan oil. These were not acts of surrender, but of pressure management — moves to reduce strain rather than project strength. More telling was what China apparently avoided raising: Taiwan, South China Sea, US chip restrictions, and US nuclear testing. These are central to Beijing’s strategic posture, yet were left unsaid. The silence was strategic. China came to Busan to buy time.

The roots lie in China’s domestic situation. Days earlier, the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Party Congress met in a subdued mood. The country faces a prolonged property slump, high local government debt, youth unemployment, and shrinking foreign investor confidence. The swagger that defined recent years — South China Sea island-building and “wolf warrior” diplomacy – now looks overextended. Officials are speaking of the need for a “favourable external environment”, an unusual admission that China needs to ease external pressure.

Hints of Deng Xiaoping resurfaced. His principle — taoguang yanghui, hide your strength and bide your time — guided China’s rise for decades. Xi had rejected that caution in favour of a more assertive global role. By late 2025, Beijing’s tone shows a trace of Deng-style pragmatism: Ambition intact but scaled-down volume. China’s recalibration is visible in three areas.

In security, where the People’s Liberation Army has toned down its posture. Military exercises around Taiwan are shorter and more predictable, signalling resolve without courting risk. South China Sea patrols maintain presence but avoid escalation. The tone is vigilance without provocation.

In diplomacy, Chinese diplomats are less combative. The Global Times has softened its rhetoric. China has returned to phrases like “mutual respect” and “win–win cooperation,” which had faded during its confrontational phase.

And in domestic politics, the Party has prioritised stability. Campaigns central to Xi’s rule — anti-corruption, “common prosperity,” cultural messaging — have shifted to a steadier, risk-averse mode. The goal is to keep the system stable through uncertainty, not to change course.

This is not retreat but a tactical lowering of sails. Easing rare earth controls was framed at home as “optimisation”, aimed at slowing Western diversification and preserving leverage. The Busan concessions were designed for short-term relief, not long-term softness.

China’s next phase could take one of three forms.

One is a strategic pause: Stabilise the economy, rebuild external trust, upgrade technology, and return to the world stage with renewed strength — a modern Deng-style reset. A second is drift: An unsettled decade of half-measures, brittle nationalism, and unpredictable policy swings. Neither assertive nor conciliatory, simply reactive. The third is quiet adaptation: Selective technological gains, new supply chains, and pragmatic diplomacy that allows China to regain momentum with less noise.

For India, Busan offers a moment to read both China and itself. At the ASEAN Summit, Narendra Modi avoided a public appearance with Trump. Washington saw electoral calculation; Beijing perhaps saw prudence; many Indians saw strategic restraint. India is prone to step cautiously given recent geopolitical trends with the US, especially in Asia’s close-quarters neighbourhood. PM Modi’s caution may yet prove right.

China’s pause offers both opportunity and risk. A China fixated on domestic issues may be easier to engage, yet also more sensitive. India should use this period to reinforce its economic, military, and tech resilience — not to imitate China, but to avoid being caught off guard if Beijing regains momentum. India should deepen partnerships but avoid triumphalism. Public gloating rarely plays well in Asia, where face and pride carry weight.

Any schadenfreude shown by India at this moment of Chinese introspection could harden Beijing faster than any policy disagreement. India learned from Doklam and Galwan that Chinese insecurity can be more destabilising than Chinese confidence. Better to keep communication open, avoid needless friction, and prepare quietly for the pause to end.

A connected challenge is managing President Trump. A sadder but wiser Delhi is wary of being used as a prop. Trump values loyalty as performance and prefers spectacle. India gains little by appearing eager.

A steadier approach is a firm, unsentimental partnership: Close enough to influence, distant enough to avoid being drafted into someone else’s rivalry. Three habits matter.

Work with the wider US system, not just the White House. Congress, the Pentagon, governors, tech firms, and think tanks provide continuity beyond one president. Set boundaries early and privately. Trump often respects firmness behind closed doors more than praise in public.

Build cooperation only where it serves India’s long-term interests — defence co-production, supply chain resilience, critical minerals, and skilled mobility — without acting as America’s “China card”. India’s influence comes from being a voice others look for, not an echo.

The Busan meeting was not a settlement but a pause. Beijing recognised that pushback had grown and that it needed to regroup. Strategic quiet rarely lasts. It may lead to renewal, stagnation or resurgence.

India should use the pause to reinforce guardrails, reduce flashpoints, and prepare for the China that appears when the quiet ends. China’s lulls are rarely permanent. The skill lies in knowing when silence signals retreat, and when it is simply the inhale before the dragon’s next exhale of fire.

The writer is a former Foreign Secretary