Opinion Delhi’s new terms of engagement: strike deep, re-open Indus, raise terror cost

Since it came to power in 2014, the Modi government has sought to alter the traditional terms of engagement with Pakistan shaped by its nuclear weapons and its pursuit of cross-border terror with impunity.

In the crisis that followed Pakistan’s terror attack on Uri in 2016, Delhi signalled that the Line of Control was no longer sacrosanct and it would be ready to cross it to attack the terror infrastructure in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

In the wake of the Pulwama terror attacks in 2019, Delhi chose to go beyond PoK and attack a terror camp in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The same year also saw Delhi change the constitutional status quo in Kashmir. The message to Islamabad was clear: the status of Jammu and Kashmir will no longer be on the table for talks with Pakistan.

In the current crisis, Delhi reached deep into the Panjab to hit at terror camps there. Delhi, the government is saying, will no longer hold back in countering the sources of terror. One of the key outcomes of the present crisis is the decision to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio claimed Saturday that both sides agreed to talk on a “broad set of issues,” at a “neutral site.” Delhi, however, would wait to see whether the Pakistan army is sincere about implementing the ceasefire agreement.

When talks do begin with Pakistan at some point –how and when and where are all unknowns at this time – the issue from the Indian perspective would be the re-negotiation of the terms of the Indus treaty.

That, in turn, would be part of revising the framework for bilateral engagement that emerged in the early 1990s, when India was at one of its weakest moments.

Another change in the structure of engagement with Pakistan is the role of third parties. The series of India-Pak military conflicts starting with the one that followed Operation Brass Tacks in the winter of 1986-87 through the Kargil war in 1999 and the Balakot strike in 2019 to the current confrontation following the Pahalgam massacre by Pak-backed terrorists all have several distinct features.

One is common to all: the international involvement in conflict termination.

This was driven by the fact that Pakistan had acquired nuclear weapons in the late 1980s and India followed soon after. The fear that an India-Pakistan military conflict could escalate into a nuclear exchange has long animated US policy in South Asia and defined the hyphenation.

The initial reactions from the United States, especially by President Donald Trump and Vice President J D Vance, suggested a hands-off approach given that Washington’s table was overflowing with other wars – tariff, Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Hamas and the political battles within.

Indeed, their initial message was that it was up to India and  Pakistan to figure it out. But as soon as the conflict escalated, Rubio, who is also the current national security adviser, got on the phone with Delhi and Rawalpindi.

Even as the traditional big powers swooped in to separate India and Pakistan, Delhi and Rawalpindi have, over the years, shown the capacity to negotiate agreements between themselves.

During 2004 to 2007, Delhi and Rawalpindi negotiated major breakthroughs, including on Kashmir. But they could not be translated into concrete political outcomes.

In February 2021, the two sides negotiated a ceasefire agreement that  opened the door for productive engagement. That opportunity too was squandered by Pakistan amidst internal differences between Islamabad and Rawalpindi. The rise of Gen Asim Munir in 2022 added to the renewed toxicity in the bilateral relationship.

The crisis has also underlined the urgent need for accelerated defence reform that can generate a decisive edge for the Indian armed forces over Pakistan’s military. Operational military superiority is critical for the government if it wants to make good the promise made today to treat any terror attack originating in Pakistan as “an act of war”.

While overall national power vis a vis Pakistan has grown in favour of India, the military gap remains too small for Delhi to impose its will on Rawalpindi or deter it from supporting cross border terror.

For India, changing the terms of engagement with Pakistan would necessarily involve developing serious outreach to diverse elements of the Pakistani polity and society. That will also help it decide how to climb the steps up the escalatory ladder the next time around.

Even more important, it could help strengthen the democratic forces and chip away at the suffocating dominance of the Pakistan army over the polity and society.  Major military confrontations with India have often produced internal political change in Pakistan.

It remains to be seen if the latest crisis has consolidated Gen Munir’s hold over power or it has cracked open some space for the civilian leaders who pushed for de-escalation despite the army chief’s hard line.

The people of India and Pakistan have seen the horrible face of the modern war of drones and long-distance fire. Unlike the Kargil and Galwan conflicts that took place in remote Himalayas, India’s cities have felt the heat of war after long. This will hopefully create better appreciation of the dangers of war and deeper introspection on the tragic state of bilateral relations eight decades after independence.

(C. Raja Mohan is distinguished fellow at the Council for Strategic and Defence Research, Delhi and a contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express)