Opinion Dealing with an unfriendly ally

Today,Pakistan’s army is seen in the US — especially in Congress — as an adversary,above all because it resists targeting Afghan militants who take refuge on Pakistani soil. The resentment is so deep that even American conservatives,historically pro-Pakistan,call for a strategy that punishes the country.

There are those who would advocate “containment,” a central element of which is boxing in the military by treating presumably more liberal civilians as pre-eminent partners,or even labelling specific members of the military and its spy agency,the ISI,as “terrorists.”

The premise for these views is correct: that the Pakistani military and intelligence apparatus undermines American interests in Afghanistan and keeps civilians from changing Pakistan’s assertive role in Afghanistan — now exercised via the Afghan insurgents fighting US and NATO forces.

Unfortunately,the proposed remedy is as misplaced as was past support for Pakistan’s military dictators,which came at the cost of the country’s democratic evolution. Those who would force changes by playing a divide-and-rule game grossly exaggerate America’s capacity to influence Pakistani politics. American attempts to actively exploit Pakistan’s civil-military disconnect are likely to end up strengthening right-wing rhetoric in Pakistan,create even more space for security-centric policies,and further alienate the Pakistani people from the US.

To begin with,any US conceptualisation of Pakistan as two Pakistans — that is,a neat division between civilian and military elites — is false and will not resonate among Pakistanis. It is wrong to assume that a majority of Pakistanis would support a US policy so obviously driven to undercut the military,although there is widespread hope — even within the army — that the political system will produce more competent politicians.

Even though a number of Pakistani mainstream political parties express their desire to curb the army’s power,few want to be seen as inviting a US role to achieve this. American trustworthiness is doubted across the political spectrum. More,association with any US effort would set in motion nationalistic forces aiming to discredit the political parties choosing to welcome a US role and galvanise the masses to support an anti-American,pro-nationalist agenda.

An apt illustration of the sentiment among the civilian political elites was provided by the so-called memogate scandal,in which a Pakistan ambassador to Washington was accused of eliciting US support to avert a military coup in return for the promise of a number of national security concessions. Former PM Nawaz Sharif,who has been the most vocal critic of the military and ISI,petitioned the Pakistani Supreme Court to declare the alleged act treasonous,and the governing Pakistan Peoples Party also pledged that it would never endorse such a quid quo pro with Washington.

The Pakistan military’s response to a two-Pakistans approach would,more than likely,cost the US the all-important intelligence cooperation needed to tackle global terrorist threats emanating from Pakistan,which are certain to remain beyond the US-NATO drawdown from Afghanistan.

Although Pakistan is governed poorly,the current civilian government has begun to squeeze the military’s space internally and the courts are groping for a role compatible with democratic norms even though they cause instability in the short run by decisions like the one to dismiss the country’s PM. An American attempt to treat the Pakistani military as an enemy will only provide the institution an opportunity to turn the tables to its advantage. What,then,would be an effective policy?

Washington should view engagement with Islamabad as a long-term project. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons will be around long after Afghanistan is forgotten. As much as possible,America should work directly with the civilian leadership on all issues,including security,and lower the profile of military-to-military meetings. Washington should also make clear that the US will not tolerate any extra-constitutional measures by the military that short-circuit the democratic process. Moreover,Washington needs to quietly encourage the spectacular progress in India-Pakistan normalisation. India is what drives Pakistan; America should take advantage of its relationship with New Delhi to allow Pakistan greater space for accelerating its internal political reforms.

We must patiently try to turn Pakistan from an ally that is no friend into a state that seeks normal relations with America and its neighbours. Short cuts are unlikely to work.

Cohen is a senior fellow at Brookings Institution. Yusuf is South Asia adviser at US Institute of Peace