Opinion Battle for Maharashtra
Why the Congress is re-evaluating its marriage with the NCP....
The coalition between Congress and the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) has not only been a marriage of convenience,it has also been a somewhat unwilling liaison,given the past record of divorce and marriage. For starters,the NCP was Congress (S) in its previous incarnation. Post-emergency,there was a split in the state Congress when one group led by Y.B. Chavan formed a separate Congress party opposed to the Indira Gandhi-led Congress,known since then as the Congress (I) at the all-India level. From the Chavan group (variously called as Congress-Urs/Congress-Reddy),Sharad Pawar broke away in 1978 with 18 MLAs,formed the Congress (S) and allied with the Janata party and the Peasants and Workers Party to form a coalition government of the Progressive Democratic Front (PDF). This Congress (S) finally merged with the Congress (I) in 1986. The relationship between the Pawar faction and the loyalist Congress was never very cordial after this merger. But given his skills and abilities,Pawar became chief minister in 1988 and again in 1990,and soon rose to national prominence in post-Rajiv Congress politics. The rest is (more recent) history the formation of the NCP in June 1999,ostensibly on the issue of Sonia Gandhis place of birth. This party,in formal Election Commission parlance is National,but its life and soul reside in Maharashtra.
NCP-Congress alliance:
Swiftly adapting to the post-election scenario,the NCP and Congress decided to come together and form a government in the state after the 1999 assembly election that took place along with the Lok Sabha election. In 2004,both parties decided to enter into a pre-election alliance for both the parliamentary election in April-May and the assembly election in October. While this was part of Sonia Gandhis larger game plan of building a coalition to bring the Congress back to power,for Pawar,this was a chance to survive in national politics and also facilitate power-sharing for his followers at the state level. This alliance
continued in the last Lok Sabha
election as well.
Then why has one section within the Congress kept up sustained pressure for severing the alliance?
While this can be attributed to the long history of local factionalism within the Congress,the immediate cause is the not-so-impressive performance of the state NCP in the recent Lok Sabha elections. The records of segment-wise assembly leads show that the Congress gained a lead in 81 assembly segments while winning 17 seats to the Lok Sabha. The NCP,winning only 8 seats,could gain a lead in 50 assembly segments. This is in contrast to the 71 seats won by the NCP in the 2004 assembly,more than the 69-seat tally of the Congress. For the Congress,there are two parts to the argument: one,there is goodwill for the Congress nationally; riding on that and capitalising on the performance in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections,this may be its one chance to get rid of the coalition and yet win around 110+ seats. The Uttar Pradesh strategy may be the model. The next-best scenario will be to use this as a bargaining counter to push the NCP into accepting fewer seats in the coalition and later accepting less important portfolios. Knowing that the NCP has no alternative but to stay with the Congress Pawars national-level politics depends on the alliance with the Congress the Congress wants to make the most of the NCPs predicament. In the event of a pre-election alliance,a chastised NCP can be forced to accept much less than what they contested last time,or what they can legitimately claim on the basis of current leads and runner-up positions. Last time,after driving a hard bargain,Congress could get 157 seats to itself and NCP could get 124. It is another matter that the winning ratio of the two partners was different: for the Congress,it was 44 per cent,and for the NCP, 57 per cent.
NCP on the backfoot:
This time,the Congress won 17 seats out of the 25 it contested and the NCP won 8 out of 21 (excluding the two RPI candidates fielded by the alliance). It is evident that the success rate of the Congress is much better. But of the 150 assembly segments from where the Congress was contesting,it emerged runner-up in 56 segments while NCP was runner-up in 71. This means that though its success rate is lower than the Congress,the NCP managed to retain the number two position in 56 per cent seats ,while the Congress did the same in 37 per cent of seats (besides the seats where they led). In terms of seat-sharing negotiations,it means that the Congress can claim five seats where the NCP contested and failed to be even runner-up; by that same logic,the NCP can claim 13 such seats from the Congress,if the Lok Sabha result were to be the basis of seat sharing.
Can there then be a divorce in the ten-year old alliance? Hardly. Leads by assembly segments mentioned above conceal more than what they reveal. All political parties in the state need to take into account the crucial factor of margins or distance from their nearest contestant. Only 72 of the 288 seats are safe ,with the margin of the leading party 20 per cent or more of the total votes polled. In 137 assembly segments,the leads (whichever party may be leading) are less than ten per cent. And,in as many as 66 assembly segments,the difference between the leading and runner-up candidates was less than the votes polled by a third candidate. Given this deeply fragmented electorate,its a difficult call for the Congress. Going it alone could also mean going into political wilderness in the state!
The writer teaches political science at the University of Pune
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