Political instability in the Middle East and North Africa has contributed to the outfits resurgence
After an explicable lull following Osama bin Ladens demise two years ago,though not believed to be in its fabled original shape,al-Qaeda has shown signs of new life.
International observers question the propriety and legality of the two operations. US Secretary of State John Kerry has taken the lofty position that both operations were in self-defence,and cites the Authorisation for Use of Military Force against Terrorists (AUMF) of 2001,which empowers the president to use force against any organisation that he determines was responsible for 9/11. Some legal pundits,however,opined that though the raids may have conformed to domestic law there is a problem with international law,because the USs stand that there was an ongoing non-international conflict with al-Qaeda has not been endorsed across nations. Possibly the Barawe foray was even more questionable as it was directed against al-Shabaab,an organisation that came into existence much after 9/11.
More pertinent is the wide perception that al-Qaedas ideology is more visible than before in the most unlikely of places,and it is no longer confined to either the Af-Pak region or the Middle East. The influence of regional groups in North Africa,like al-Shabaab (Somalia),al-Hijra (Kenya) and Boko Haram (Nigeria),is of concern. The bond between them points to the liklihood of chaos in this region in the future.
Observers like Juan Zarate,a former US deputy national security advisor,attach greater importance to the uncertainty in the Levant. Reports from Syria in particular speak of heightened al-Qaeda influence,with the formidable Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) spreading its influence in the northern province of Raqqa. The continual stream of foreign jihadists pouring into Syria to strengthen the rebels fighting to oust President Bashar al-Assad complicate the situation. A majority of them are radicalised Muslim youths from Europe and North America. Their return,at a later date,to their home countries could be disastrous.
All signs suggest that this is a dynamic and explosive situation that confronts many countries. This deflates the optimism that US President Barack Obama voiced a few months ago when he said that the back of al-Qaeda had been broken. This smugness seems to have given way to desperation,as evidenced by the recent daring but highly controversial operations in Somalia and Libya. Unstable and corrupt regimes,both in the Middle East and North Africa,may be expected to provide space for disgruntled young radicals to hit out at the non-Islamic world. If fellow Muslims suffer collateral damage,it does not appear to bother their conscience,as long their intended targets suffer greater harm. Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri focused attention on the US,exhorting his followers to conduct individual jihad. More dangerous was the personal attack on Obama,labelling him an apostate. This alone indicates the extremes that al-Qaeda has been driven to. The financial war against terrorists,to which Zarate refers in his just-released Treasury War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare may,after all,have had only a marginal impact on al-Qaeda and its sympathisers. The US is now hard-pressed to contend with the indoctrination and fanaticism fulled by a small band of inward-looking clerics for whom the advocacy of violence comes naturally. The controversial extraterritorial adventures by American forces could contribute to an escalation of terrorist violence.
Where does India figures in all this? The Indian Mujahideen,perhaps the only formidable and organised terrorist group in the country,may lack the numbers. But it has support from across our borders. Our intelligence agencies have a hard task at hand to keep a tab on the inspiration that the IM derives from the recent happenings in Africa and the Middle East. The one common thread the availability of indoctrinated youth is a factor that should push up our anxiety. New Delhi and the state governments can not afford to ignore this while drawing up a counterterrorism strategy. The mechanical use of the police and ignoring the need to formulate imaginative schemes to take care of the feelings of alienated Muslims will be counterproductive.
The writer is a former CBI director