Opinion After the ceasefire, Delhi needs to draw clearer red lines with Washington, especially on Kashmir

This doctrinal shift — treating terrorist attacks on Indian soil as acts of war — marks a significant strategic inflection. It formalises a new “normal” in South Asia where the threshold for Indian retaliation has been lowered, and where India’s military is increasingly empowered to dictate the terms of engagement. This evolution in posture is aimed not just at Pakistan but also at shaping international perceptions of India’s resolve and deterrence capabilities.

This episode in India-Pakistan relations, therefore, is marked by three critical inflection points.

First, it resets the bilateral rules of engagement. No longer can Pakistan assume plausible deniability through proxies or non-state actors — such actions will provoke direct military retaliation. This is not just a tactical adjustment but a strategic signaling exercise, aimed at Islamabad. Second, the conflict exposed the strategic alignment of China with Pakistan in unequivocal terms. While India has on-ground evidence of Pakistani munitions which are Chinese-made systems, Beijing’s response was calculatedly delayed. China’s first substantive engagement came only after the ceasefire was achieved, underscoring its reactive — not preventive — role in the crisis. This should further firm India’s view of China as a long-term strategic challenge, whose alliance with Pakistan is designed to contain India’s regional influence.

Third, the US role — particularly the mediation led by Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio under President Trump’s administration — was successful in halting further escalation but raised important questions about the future of external intervention in South Asia. While Washington’s midnight diplomacy helped impose a temporary pause in hostilities, it also revealed the limits of American understanding and political will regarding India’s national security imperatives. Although the US played a key role in de-escalating the situation, the mediation was not without flaws. President Trump’s tweet, which created a false equivalence between India and Pakistan and mentioned trade relations with both countries in the same breath, smacked of diplomatic callousness and may have rhetorically advantaged Pakistan.

This crisis presents an opportunity for Delhi to draw clearer red lines with Washington — especially on Kashmir, where any attempt to internationalise the issue will be met with firm rejection. India’s expectation is not for the US to act as a neutral arbitrator, but as a responsible global power that pressures Pakistan to rein in its support for terrorism and behave like a rational state actor.

Despite India’s operational success, the crisis also revealed areas that require urgent attention. The ability to neutralise Pakistani radar systems and strike with precision shows the progress we have made — but also the gaps that remain. The widespread use of drones, UAVs by Pakistan and the performance of India’s air defence systems should provide useful lessons for the next combat. On the internal front, this means accelerating indigenous production of next-generation technologies, improving cyber warfare and intelligence capacities, and investing in a modern, joint military command structure. On the external front, India must continue to diversify its defence procurement partners while retaining strategic control over command systems and operational doctrine.

From a geopolitical perspective, India now has a sharper understanding of which countries can be counted on in times of conflict — and which cannot. While the US remains a critical partner in the Indo-Pacific, with Trump at the helm it is increasingly clear that Washington’s unilateral transactional bargain with Pakistan cannot be ruled out. At the broader level, India must chart its approach toward countries like China, Turkey, and Azerbaijan — nations that have aligned themselves more clearly with Pakistan, either for ideological, religious, or geopolitical reasons. This clarity will inform not just India’s diplomacy but also its long-term security architecture.

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the India-Pakistan conflict remains Islamabad’s habitual recourse to nuclear brinkmanship. The international community, particularly nuclear non-proliferation advocates, must address this. A state cannot continuously rely on its nuclear arsenal as a shield for sub-conventional warfare and terrorism. The burden of future strategic restraint should not fall on New Delhi alone.

The most recent India-Pakistan crisis marks a turning point in the strategic doctrine, international positioning, and military capabilities of India. The crisis may be over, but the lessons it offers — about power, partnerships, and policy — will shape India’s future choices in both war and peace.

The writer is Deputy Director, Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation