Opinion A more military paramilitary

The broadly agreed arrangement is that state police forces continue with their operations while the Central paramilitary forces are deployed in a grid-like fashion in selected places to both hold and simultaneously weed out any Naxal presence. The big idea being that once these areas are completely clear,then development initiatives can start,through an unprecedented infiltration of the civil administration.

That is,unfortunately,just the theory. What happened in Dantewada on Tuesday goes in the face of all this. Many explanations have been on offer — the intelligence was faulty,the local police not fully supportive,it was not the mandate of the CRPF to venture that far on its own,the forces got sucked into a trap,they were outnumbered,so on and so forth. The list is only going to increase in the days to come.     

Two facts,however,don’t change: the Naxals were,indeed,tactically far superior and that the 80-strong CRPF complement never really got into any position to counterattack. Surprise and deception are hallmarks of any kind of tactical campaign,be it guerrilla warfare or a conventional assault. This is a basic military tenet and so while it is important to investigate what exactly went wrong,the question before the strategists is that Naxals will inevitably end up achieving surprise on some occasions — does it then have to turn into such a resounding success for them?

This is what is disturbing about the Dantewada massacre. There was hardly any counter. And this then begs the question whether untrained policemen are being sent for the wrong job. The adversary is not just superior in tactical thought but even in motivation,execution and discipline. If an 80-man contingent is on the move,then where were its scouts who are supposed to move ahead? What happened to the “point section”,which is usually a 10-man group — supposed to be led by an officer — that follows the scouts and checks for enemy presence,probes for mines and essentially ascertains whether there is an ambush? Only when all that is clear,is the main body supposed to move,with a platoon-plus section giving it cover from the rear.

It is impossible to conceive of an 80-man group helplessly trapped if this drill is followed to the last detail. The reason for such drills — tested,tried and modified in the several counter-insurgency operations Indian forces have faced so far — is to guard against precisely the kind of annihilation that happened in Dantewada. This ensures that there is always someone covering the other and not everyone is sucked into an ambush or a trap.

It is vital to know why the CRPF contingent could not stage an effective counter; because that alone will point to more basic issues of training,organisation and leadership. This will also force planners to understand the importance of imbibing a military approach — because the adversary,in this case the Naxals,is as of now far superior on all three counts — and the sheer amassing of forces has probably just forced a tactical withdrawal,not a clean-up of the sorts the Centre has been hoping for.

A reassessment is needed at all levels because the Dantewada attack has also thrown up serious questions on the coordination effort. It is all well to say that no one appreciates the success of coordination when there is no incident and that once something happens,every critic cuts loose. The undeniable fact is that an incident of this magnitude just unravels all previous achievements,and serves as an important source of motivation in the adversary’s camp. The concern is not just about what happened in Dantewada,but also what the Dantewada incident does from now on. The impact it has on the psyche of a shrinking Naxal leadership,the fresh motivation and self-belief that state forces can be defeated are all serious fallouts.

Politically,the government’s apex leadership has decided that it will not use the army in the country’s heartland against its own citizens. This is a call based on relatively sound reasoning. But it does not stop the government from getting its paramilitary to learn from its army,to emulate an army-like structure in the Naxal-hit areas so that when a CRPF contingent is deployed,it doesn’t walk into a blind alley but plugs into a well-established logistics base with effective tactical and field intelligence units. The force itself needs to be fully conscious of its security and follow drills with military precision. If all this means creating a special force from within the huge paramilitary resource and then having it officered by the army,then that too must be considered. There are several models available within the limits of the political mandate,but what must first be clear is that the time has come to set aside ego battles and to seriously look into ways to fully benefit from the soldiering and leadership experience of one of the finest insurgency fighting armies in the world.

The Kargil Review Committee had made long-term suggestion that minimum mandatory military service for an army soldier to be eligible for pension must be reduced from 15 years to 7 years. The manpower that gets released must then be absorbed gradually into the paramilitary forces. Not only does that keep the army younger,it also provides experienced and trained fighting manpower to the paramilitary. This was seconded by the A.V. Singh Committee but,almost a decade later,it remains stuck on one basic tussle over seniority — the police say the army soldier who joins would be treated as a fresh recruit with no seniority carried over from the army,which is unacceptable to the military. Such tussles,trivial as they may appear,have inhibited synergy between the military and the paramilitary.

That is why Dantewada hurts even more. And,perhaps,the least that officialdom can do for the 76 massacred on Tuesday is to ensure that this incident becomes the decisive turning point in the anti-Naxal campaign,prompting a complete overhaul in mindset and approach.   

pranab.samanta@expressindia.com