
Air commodore Jasjit Singh, Editorial Advisor Defence and Strategic affairs to The Indian Express, answers your questions on strategic issues. Singh, a former director of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, can be reached at jasjitsinghexpressindia.com
8226; The United States, which was extremely unhappy with Pakistan till recently, has agreed to sell six C-130 military transport aircraft to Islamabad. These are believed to be old aircraft, and only strengthen Pakistan Air Force8217;s existing C-130 fleet. What are the implications for our defence?
You may recall that General Pervez Musharraf had made a strong bid for more US weapons during his visit to Washington two months ago on the grounds that the military balance is tilting against it, and threatened that it would make it rely even more on nuclear weapons. The present decision to supply six transport aircraft, therefore, should not come as a surprise. It appears these are old aircraft and Pakistan would be paying only 75 million for six aircraft besides the upgradation of the avionics on all the C-130s in Pakistan inventory. The price of new C-130 aircraft would be more than 45 million per piece compared to less than 10 million unit cost that Pakistan would pay for a dramatic improvement in strategic airlift capability. Incidentally, the US used to deny us the aircraft on the grounds that it is capable of also dropping nearly 20-tons of bomb load!
The real significance is that the US arms supply pipeline to Pakistan, which was under sanctions since 1990 for violating the agreement under which previous arms supplies had been made, is being opened as forecast by us The Sunday Express, 24th June, 2003. The sale of C-130s have to be approved by Congress later on. But the case would be made on the grounds that these are non-combat non-lethal systems which are necessary for Pakistan in its support to US in the war against terrorism. Americans are unlikely to ask questions about how these aircraft would help in its war against terrorism. And any argument about costs would be easily handled by the low expenditure that Pakistan would incur. Already, Pakistan is showing to the IMF that its military debt has been coming down drastically as proof of its cut back on military spending.
Pakistan itself is focusing on air force systems since its scare last year when it was deeply concerned that India would launch surgical punitive strikes with the Indian Air Force, which at present times is far superior to Pakistan Air Force in every manner. There is a growing recognition that the land battle under the nuclear umbrella would in all likelihood result in a stalemate if significant advance with attendant risks of nuclear threats was to be avoided. But air strike could deliver repeated punishing blows which Pakistan would have serious difficulties in countering. Escalation also would not provide the type of relief it may wish for. Islamabad, therefore, is bound to focus heavily in the coming years on enhancing its air force capabilities to redress the balance. There are already reports about Pakistan seeking purchase of a dozen or two F-16 combat aircraft from Denmark which have been in service for more than a decade, and whose sale would help Denmark to acquire newer aircraft. It may also be recalled that Denmark had curiously come up in justification of Pakistan last year when the whole world was critical of its role in transnational terrorism. We, of course, would need to watch developments carefully and not get complacent just because the aircraft it is getting are used ones. That does not reduce their operational capability, especially when refurbishing of avionics of the whole fleet is part of the deal.
8226; The CAG report on the army which created so much furore recently is largely focused on purchase of weapons and equipment for Kargil War, but which arrived well after the war was over. Why did the army buy crores worth of stuff after the war?
The answers to the audit report are fairly clear without any need to see classified files. What the CAG should have noted was why these purchases were required in the first place? The defence forces are authorised to keep arms, ammunition and equipment in reserve stocks to cater for a possible war. If this stock was full, there would be no need to rush for immediate buying as such. In all likelihood, shortfalls in stocking levels, like the Bofors ammunition, existed because we probably had not purchased the requisite quantity earlier. Because of the urgency of the situation, emergency procedures would have had to be resorted to. There may have been some equipment, like high-altitude clothing etc, where the scale itself may not have been enough since the Pakistani aggression was much larger than normally catered for. Thirdly, there could have been no guarantee that the war would have ended in July, as it happened, essentially because of the valour of our troops. And no one could be certain that it would not erupt again. This concern no doubt increased when the architect of the war, General Pervez Musharraf, overthrew the elected legitimate government and assumed full powers over the country after jailing the prime minister in October 1999. If these aspects are given due consideration, then it should be possible to give more rational and focused attention to procedural irregularities where they occur.