
Is Tibet a nuisance for India, and when it negotiates with China on the border issue, should India unhesitatingly sacrifice Tibetan interests to secure our own? While there has been much talk about the burden of hosting the Dalai Lama and 1,85,000 Tibetan refugees for 50 years, few have acknowledged India8217;s debt to them and why repaying that debt is not only a moral imperative but a strategically self-interested one.
The first is a civilisational debt. When the Dalai Lama teaches from the works of the Vikramshila or Nalanda masters, he always prefaces his teachings with, 8220;these are Indian treasures. We have only been its guardians in Tibet for a thousand years, and now that the teachings have faded in India we have brought them back intact. This is the gift we return to India.8221; It is no small gift.
Few will recall the sacking of Nalanda, the destruction of thousands of birch-bark books or the fact that Buddhism itself disappeared from Indian soil after the 13th century. Ask an educated Indian whether Shantideva, Atisha, Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, or Vasubandhu mean anything to them and chances are you8217;ll draw a blank. Ask a Tibetan teenager and you8217;re likely to hear the history of the Indian Buddhist masters and the journey of their teachings to Tibet from 7th-11th century AD.
Nalanda, once the greatest centre of Buddhist learning from the 5th to 12th centuries, today lives in spirit not amongst its archaeological remains in Bihar, but in the vibrant Tibetan colleges of Sera, Drepung and Ganden, relocated in Karnataka after the Tibetan exodus of 1959. These are modeled on the Nalanda tradition, transmitting India8217;s ancient treasures to meritorious students, many of whom are poor Indian Buddhists from the Himalayan belt.
The second debt is strategic and vital to India8217;s future. The Government of India has been at pains to 8216;reiterate8217; that they have 8216;always8217; considered Tibet an integral part of China; our Communists have insisted that the 8216;disturbances8217; are China8217;s 8216;internal matter.8217; The fact is that the 8216;always8217; is only five years old, and the 8216;internal matter8217; a crumbling fantasy.
In November 1950, Nehru informed the chief ministers, 8216;When news came to us that the Chinese Government had formally announced military operations against Tibet, we were surprised and distressed. Immediately we sent a note of protest to Chou En Lai on 26/10/50 and requested the Chinese Government not to proceed8230; To use coercion and armed force, when a way to peaceful settlement is open, is always wrong. To do so against a country like Tibet, which is obviously not in a position to offer much resistance and which could not injure China, seemed to us to add to the wrongness of this behaviour.8217;
India unilaterally 8216;recognised8217; the 8216;Tibet Autonomous Region,8217; as 8216;a territory of China,8217; for the first time during Vajpayee8217;s China visit in 2003. Before this, India8217;s terminology in official documents was deliberately left ambiguous. In 1954 India described Tibet as a geographic location: 8216;the Tibet region of China.8217; In 1988, the Rajiv Gandhi government brought it closer to China8217;s position, but still kept it vague enough with, 8216;Tibet is an autonomous region of China.8217; The 2003 declaration toes the Chinese line word-for-word.
What are the implications of accepting Tibet as an 8216;integral part of China8217;? First, leaving aside the distortion of Tibet8217;s long history of independence, the declaration contravenes the treaty obligations between British India and Tibet, which we have inherited under the Indian Independence Act of 1947. Two treaties directly affect our territorial integrity: the 1904 Convention Between Great Britain and Tibet, which recognises the boundary between Tibet and Sikkim, and the Anglo-Tibet Treaty of 1914, in which India recognised Tibet as an independent nation under the suzerainty as opposed to sovereignty of China. In return, Tibet was to respect the Mc Mahon Line, the eastern boundary between Tibet and Arunachal. Until the Chinese invasion of Tibet, both agreements held and the border was peaceful.
China has never accepted Sikkim and Arunachal as parts of India, even today claiming the latter as its own. But when two countries have concluded an agreement between them, China has no locus standi as a third country. A sovereign state is one that negotiates and sign treaties with other states. Once a state exists it cannot simply be wished away simply because another nation has invaded it.
That the world does not wish to challenge China8217;s illegal occupation of Tibet thus rendering it a de facto not de jure part of China is another matter. However, it is pertinent to ask why the Government of India is so solicitous of China8217;s national interests at the expense of our own. If China refuses to recognise the treaties signed by India and Tibet, there is no reason for India to recognise the 17-point 1951 agreement, thrust upon Tibet under Chinese gunpoint. China possesses no other legal documents to prove its claims over Tibet.
We have learned few lessons in foreign policy. India unilaterally surrendered its influence in Tibet in the 1954 trade agreement with China by removing its military personnel from the Tibetan trading towns of Yatung and Gyantse, giving up Indian rest houses, land, and Tibet8217;s communications including the postal, telegraph and public telephone services operated by the Government of India. The agreement had a validity of eight years, and it is no coincidence that its expiry coincided with the 1962 war. If those who parrot the 8216;Tibet is an integral part of China8217; line paused to think, they would realise that they are unwittingly conceding China8217;s claim over 83,743 sq km of Arunachal territory.
The Dalai Lama8217;s 8216;middle way8217; position has been clear since the mid-8217;80s: autonomy and not independence. It begs the question why, if China is willing to pursue a 8216;one country, two systems8217; policy in the Han-majority areas of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau, is it so hysterically opposed to the Tibetan proposals. In 1999 Wang Lixion, a prominent Chinese intellectual, pointed out that an independent or autonomous Tibet under the influence of the Dalai Lama, 8216;would naturally orient it towards India,8217; taking 2.5 million sq km or 26 per cent of China8217;s land mass away from China8217;s sphere of influence into India8217;s. To lose this vast swathe of land would be to 8216;expose China8217;s fatal underbelly.8217; It should be understood that it is not on its demerits that the Dalai Lama8217;s proposals are being rejected, but because of India8217;s potential influence.
While one is not advocating India8217;s lebensraum or hostilities with China, one should be aware that China controls the headwaters of many Indian rivers that originate in the Tibetan plateau. India is already facing acute water shortages. China has already anticipated its future water problems by damming the headwaters of the Sutlej and Brahmaputra. While the 8216;thirsty8217; provinces of Xingjian and Gansu will undoubtedly benefit by China8217;s plans to divert the waters of the Brahmaputra, India needs to wake up well before our rivers begin drying up.
It is time we recognised that Tibet and India8217;s destinies are entwined. To sacrifice Tibet8217;s interests would mean to sacrifice our own. There is no need to go down that road again.
The writer is a journalist who has studied Buddhism for the last 20 years