Where shall I go next?

Even the United States, which under George Bush adopted an implacably hostile attitude to Mr Assad, has retracted some prickles. A terrorist-hunting raid across the Iraqi border by American special forces in October, who Syria complained killed seven civilians, has since been downplayed by both countries. Advocates of engaging with Syria have grown more vocal in the American foreign-policy establishment, and look forward eagerly to the departure of figures such as Elliott Abrams, who as Mr Bush8217;s influential deputy national security adviser argued relentlessly for Syria to be shunned; it is widely thought that he told the Israelis, who sought an American green light to start secret talks, to hold off. But another senior American official says the resumption of dialogue with Syria and the incoming administration is so obviously a good idea as to be a 8220;no brainer8221;.

It is easy to explain why everyone was angry with Syria. Under the younger Assad, it has strengthened its 30-year-old strategic alliance with the Islamic Republic of Iran, ramped up weapons deliveries to Hizbullah, the intractable and well-armed Shia movement in Lebanon, and promoted a hardline stand by Hamas, a Palestinian Islamist group that pioneered suicide attacks on Israeli civilians. Syria is accused of trying to develop nuclear weapons Israel bombed a suspected reactor in 2007 and of sabotaging Western efforts to steady the region in the wake of America8217;s launch of its war on terror, by sponsoring serial assassinations in Lebanon and encouraging insurgents in Iraq. At home, Mr Assad reverted to his father8217;s style after a brief flirtation with liberalism, and sent his critics to prison or exile.

Syria8217;s sympathisers explained that many of these policies reflected Mr Assad8217;s fear of being surrounded and squeezed. This was understandable, considering America8217;s invasion of neighbouring Iraq, the bellicose tone of Mr Bush8217;s administration, the sudden upsurge of anti-Syrian nationalism in Lebanon that chased Syria8217;s long-ensconced supporters out of power in a country seen in Damascus as its backyard, and the far greater firepower of Israel, whose occupation of the Golan Heights has been a humiliating thorn in Syria8217;s side since 1967. Mr Assad felt vulnerable at home, too, presiding over a shaky police state dominated by his own minority Alawite sect, a Baathist party long since denuded of vision, a stumbling socialist economy, and a coterie of spy agencies run like rival mafia clans.

The reasons for Syria8217;s rehabilitation are subtler. They do not reflect a liking for Mr Assad8217;s regime, though seeing the agonies suffered by Iraq, a country of similarly sectarian complexity, a grudging respect has increased for Syria8217;s model of political oppression coupled with religious tolerance. Rather, the thawing of attitudes reflects a recognition of Syria8217;s importance to a range of the region8217;s troubles. Simply by remaining unbeaten, Mr Assad has opened minds to the possibility that having his regime on side could cause less damage than leaving it as an enemy.

The attraction of weaning Syria from its spoiler role may have been best described by Israel8217;s outgoing prime minister, Ehud Olmert. According to Aluf Benn, a columnist in the Israeli daily, Ha8217;aretz, Mr Olmert struggled in a recent meeting to persuade a sceptical American president that the Golan Heights may be a worthwhile price to pay for a full-blown change in the region8217;s strategic alignment. Syria, Mr Olmert explained, sat at the crux of two axes, one linking Iran to Hamas via Hizbullah, the other linking such 8220;pragmatic8221; powers as Turkey, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. A switch by Syria would dramatically weaken the extremists, the Israeli leader was said to have concluded.

The heights of delight

Despite repeated denials from Syria that it would be willing to dump its 8220;axis of evil8221; allies, diplomats say plenty of levers could be used to prompt such a move. Considering his father8217;s failed effort to recapture the Golan Heights in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, securing the territory would hugely boost Mr Assad8217;s prestige. Syria8217;s economy, which has survived largely thanks to high oil prices, faces a double plunge from collapsing crude reserves and world prices. Foreign investment is vital to dampen unemployment that is unofficially estimated as topping 20 per cent. Syria8217;s leaders fear, even more than their neighbours, the local influence of the same Islamist groups they sponsor abroad. It does not require much imagination to comprehend their underlying ideological discomfort with Iran. The two countries8217; alliance has served both well, but it is solely one of interests rather than belief: these can change.

Yet several variables suggest that the choices, for Syria and everyone else, may be blurrier. Elections in Israel in February could produce a government opposed to any concessions. If prospects for region-wide peace wane, Syria may judge that a return to rejectionism makes strategic sense. The convening in March of an international tribunal investigating the murder in 2005 of Rafik Hariri, a five-times prime minister of Lebanon, could embarrass Syria just when Mr Assad could be being wooed. Trends in Lebanon suggest a return to power, perhaps following elections scheduled for June, of pro-Syrian factions, which could either soothe Syrian fears or bolster Mr Assad8217;s confidence that he need not change his ways.

Some think he has no intention of doing so, anyway. Walid Jumblatt, the pugnacious Lebanese Druze chieftain who blames the killing of his own father on Assad pegrave;re, recently derided the 8220;stupid illusions8221; of Westerners who believe that the 8220;wild beast8221; that they say is Syria8217;s regime could ever change its stripes.

copy; The Economist Newspaper Limited 2008