PANEL: Existing police machinery inadequate to assess seriousness of intelligence alerts. No specific alert from central agencies to Mumbai and Maharashtra Police. Wrong to say Mumbai and Maharashtra Police did not take alerts seriously. Joint CP Law amp; Order had warned Taj Mahal hotel,the World Trade Centre and The Oberoi on August 9,2008,about threat and local DCP had given written orders about security measures they needed to take. On September 24,2008,there was tip-off from central agencies that Lashkar-e-Toiba was eyeing the Taj and local DCP had held meetings with the hotels security officers.
GOVERNMENT: On November 26,2008,there was security meeting at the Trident about proposed visit to that hotel by VVIP on November 29. This meeting went on till 8 pm and even central agencies at meeting had no idea about exact time of attack. After 26/11,senior Home Department,police,central and state intelligence officials in Mumbai are holding weekly meetings. Analysis is being done on how to deal with alerts.
PANEL: Taj and Oberoi did not implement security advice given by DCP Zone 1 and did not ask for increasing security.
GOVERNMENT: Security audits of Taj and Oberoi have been done and all steps taken to raise security levels such as screening baggage of visitors and keeping a vigil in the lobbies.
PANEL: Intelligence alerts received from DGP office or ATS or home department passed on mechanically,which creates confusion. Panel recommends Principal Secretary,Home should be appointed nodal officer to handle alerts and only forward serious threats and take all responsibility. Additional Chief Secretary Home will be responsible for briefing Chief Secretary and CM on security. Small group of senior officers should be formed to issue orders to act on alerts given by central agencies. DGP should appoint such groups across the state.
GOVERNMENT: Home Department has changed procedure about acting on alerts. Principal Secretary Home has been appointed nodal officer to receive alerts and act on them. To analyse and scrutinize alerts weekly meetings will be held.
PANEL: Mumbai police needs a fully equipped quick response team QRT to handle attacks such as 26/11. Existing QRT should be revamped and converted into a commando unit that can reach any part of city swiftly. Existing assault mobiles seem to be armed police that can handle law and order problems or a gang war but not terror. Existing procedure requires Joint CP Law and Order to take charge of control room and joint CP Crime and Joint CP ATS to work in tandem. On 26/11,these procedures were not followed. Police Commissioner asked Joint CP Crime to take charge of control room when he could have done better job of handling force deployment. Joint CP Crime handled situation efficiently. Control room officers also did good job. No point having procedures if officers such as CP or DGP do not follow them. CP also did not seek report from ATS after incident or do detailed analysis.
GOVERNMENT: Fully equipped QRT will be established in Mumbai and other cities and converted into commando force. Joint CP Law and Order will handle disaster management and supervise control rooms. On 26/11,Joint CP Law and Order was in the central control room supervising deployment of units until DGP asked him to go elsewhere. It is wrong to say procedures were violated. The government will analyse and study the procedures and remove the lacunae.
PANEL: No machinery to pass information to media as things were happening at several places and all information was available only with control room. Disaster management chief or official deputed by police commissionerate should have done this job.
GOVERNMENT: Chief Secretary had opened a disaster management centre in Mantralaya and media was being informed about situation. Official spokesman was appointed immediately. Government will ensure official spokesperson keeps in touch with media and keeps them informed.
PANEL: Navy and Coast Guard are responsible for guarding the coast but role of state coastal police not clear. Impossible for Mumbai or Maharashtra police to take over responsibility of coastal security. Panel feels existing state coastal security system is a just a showpiece and state should address this.
GOVERNMENT: Jurisdiction and specific responsibilities of Navy,Coast Guard and state not clear. State Home Department in collaboration with Fisheries Department has taken measures to strengthen coastal police. State has decided to use speedboats and 46 boats have been hired. 400 policemen in 20 units have been trained. 12 coastal police stations have been opened,24 police posts established and 7 additional posts will be created. Two ships acquired for patrolling.
PANEL: Existing ceiling of Rs 25 lakh for any purchase for Home Department needing Home Minister approval should be raised.
GOVERNMENT: Police Department has two kinds of purchases and only modernization costing more than Rs 25 lakh needs government approval. There is no confusion or problem.
PANEL: Need to streamline procedure of purchases and decentralize it. Empowered committee should be established to study proposals and act instead of delaying purchases through paperwork.
GOVERNMENT: Home Department already taken decision to revamp procedure of annual purchases and orders have been issued. Empowered committee has been established.
PANEL: Availability of weapons and ammunition is a problem. According to DG A N Roy,QRT needs to practice firing every fourth day. Because of scarcity of ammunition,QRT not able to practice since Sept 2007. DG has told panel every year every policeman has to fire 40 rounds. Police Dept needs ammunition in that quantity. But in past five years,required ammunition was not available. Available stock has to be distributed on priority basis to Naxal areas,special commandos etc. DG says shortage has affected attacking abilities of force. Last supplies of AK47 bullets was 45,000 in 2005. After December 2006,no ammunition of any kind supplied. This needs immediate action.
GOVERNMENT: Ammunition being regularly purchased. In 2006/07,165,810 units for AK47 and in 2008/09,38,195 bullets were supplied. Wrong to say that after 45,000 AK47 bullets supplied in 2005,no bullets were supplied. Government will evolve weapons policy and cover all kinds of weapons for all levels.
PANEL: No officer of any level should change procedure or decision taken by state Government committee found smooth working of ATS was hurt because of the dual control. ATS should be handled in manner that its prowess is not reduced. Similar units should be created outside Mumbai but not be paraded as showpieces. Such units should not be divided to suit whims of some officers.
GOVERNMENT: Government agrees that no officer should change or meddle with the decisions. Government has created the post of DG Special Operations to handle this. So question of dual control does not arise. Besides,Force 1 has been established on lines of NSG and it is equipped with modern weapons.
PANEL: Government should reiterate that all terror attacks should be probed only by ATS.
GOVERNMENT: Government accepts and decision will be taken and orders
issued.
PANEL: Need to make private establishments responsible for implementing Government security advisories. After 26/11,all private places visited by foreigners should create own security machinery in consultation with police.
GOVERNMENT: As mentioned above security audit has been done and necessary action being taken.
PANEL: Getting CCTV footage from private parties is a hassle and legal steps needed on every occasion. Private security personnel not well trained or equipped. Mumbai police also needs to stay in close touch with mobile phone service providers and also improve its ability to tap suspicious mobile calls.
GOVERNMENT: Will take measures to train private security personnel. Legal provisions will be made to obtain CCTV footage from private parties.
PANEL: Fill vacancies in the police. Existing training facilities inadequate. Appoint retired police officers as trainers on contract.
GOVERNMENT: Special action plan being implemented. Vacancies from Dy SP/ACP to DG level will be filled by July end. Vacancies at level of PSIS will be filled by October end.
PANEL: Create state industrial security force as police unable to protect all non-government areas and institutions on lines of Gujarat model. Retired police officers should train them. Local youth will get jobs through this.
GOVERNMENT: Government has decided to set up state industrial security force on lines of CISF. Legal and organisational issues are being worked out and force will be ready by October end.
PANEL: Police protection provided by the state to private individuals burdens the treasury.
GOVERNMENT: There is a clear policy of providing protection to an individual based on the evaluated threat perception. If a specific person has a threat to his life and if the police recommend it,the state Government provides security to such a person free. If someone asks for security,they are charged. A Government panel periodically reviews the threat perception of such individuals and takes appropriate decisions.
PANEL: The control room is not up to the mark. It also functions as the disaster management centre. We recommend a new building on the plot behind the 150-year-old building that houses the Commissioners office.
GOVERNMENT: The control room is fully equipped. We will strengthen it and make it explosive-proof and fire-proof.
PANEL: Three decades ago,the National Police Commission made several recommendations that were ratified by the Supreme Court. They should be implemented to revamp the police force.
GOVERNMENT: The implementation is being done in the following manner:
amp;149;The State Security Commission has been established.
amp;149;Tenure of the Director General of Police and his selection has been specified as per orders.
amp;149;For Inspector General of Police,the policy on transfer and appointments has been fixed and SHO and above get a tenure of 2 years and above.
amp;149;Decentralised detection process in districts,cities and towns. Will be taken to small cities.
amp;149;Created Police Establishment Board and transfers are being done by this board.
PANEL: The work done by the Mumbai police machinery in handling the situation at the five spots is praiseworthy. Young officers who showed courage and bravery need to be praised.
GOVERNMENT: We will inform the police officers and personnel concerned that the panel has praised them.
PANEL: In such a situation,the Commissioner of Police should have taken control of the control room. This would have prevented overlapping.
GOVERNMENT: The panel does not specify the instances of overlap. The remarks from the Commissioner of Police have not been taken on record and the Commissioner was stationed at the regional control room created for the purpose. Till the end,he was in contact with different units and was controlling them.
PANEL: It is shocking that under the existing procedures,senior officers in Mantralaya dont get intelligence reports. According to the Bombay Police Act,1951,the Home Department controls the entire state police force and it is shocking that such information is not passed on.
GOVERNMENT: We cannot accept this opinion as the Commissioner of Intelligence regularly briefs the Additional Chief Secretary Home and the Director General of Police every week. The DGP and CS and regional officers are issued written orders after the weekly review. Under Section 6 and Section 24 of the Bombay Police Act,1951,it is necessary to call for reports from the DGP on crime and law and order and hence the action to be taken is by the officers under the DGP. After 26/11,weekly meetings are being held under the Home Department.
PANEL: There was no callousness in handling tip-offs from central agencies.
GOVERNMENT: No remarks.
PANEL: This war-like attack was beyond the capability of not just the Mumbai police but that of any other police machinery. An attack of this magnitude could be handled only by an agency like the NSG.
GOVERNMENT: No remarks.
PANEL: The Commissioner of Police did not take the lead in handling the situation. During the entire operation,he was stationed at one spot near the Trident Hotel. This created an impression among the public that the police commissionerate could not handle the operation efficiently. Had the Commissioner contacted officers by wireless sets or on their mobile phones,it would have created some team spirit,several officers feel. We have come to the conclusion that Mr Hassan Gafoor lacks leadership qualities.
GOVERNMENT: We cannot accept the opinion of the panel because it has said that the Mumbai Police has discharged its duties in a proper manner. If so,how could their leader have been unsuccessful?
PANEL: We need more efficient and equipped machinery to face terror acts. GOVERNMENT: We have laid special focus on modernisation of the police force,creating Force One and the post of Director General of Police Special Operations. The process has already been initiated.
PANEL: There is a need to examine how well other cities in the state are equipped to handle a similar terror attack. There has to be an integrated action plan for Mumbai,Thane and Navi Mumbai,irrespective of the administrative boundaries of the three commissionerates.
GOVERNMENT: We will constitute a panel of experts to examine the preparedness in the main cities of the state. There is no question of administrative barriers coming in the way of forming an action plan.