
The nuclear testing by North Korea, the passing of the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on the US and the fourth anniversary of the October 12, 2002 terrorist attacks on Bali, and the growing unpopularity of the war in Iraq in the US, should be reason for a brief reflection: how has the global war on terror launched by the US changed East Asia8217;s security landscape?
At first glance, most Asian powers seem to have gained some geopolitical mileage out of the global war on terror. For Japan, it contributed to a significant strengthening of the US-Japan security relationship. To be sure, this process was already underway, triggered by China8217;s rise, and North Korea8217;s nuclear ambition. But the Japanese government led by former prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, could use the US war on terror as the perfect pretext for carrying out far-reaching changes in Japan8217;s security policy, including deployment of the Japanese navy in the Indian Ocean in a supporting mission to the US military action against Al Qaeda and Iraq.
China also appears to be a winner in the global war on terror. The American preoccupation with Afghanistan and Iraq detracted attention from the 8220;containing China8221; agenda of the neo-conservatives in the Bush administration. Beijing not only got a reprieve from the hardline US policy favouring Taiwan. The diversion of US strategic attention to the Middle East theatres also allowed China to quietly build-up its diplomatic clout in Southeast Asia through a diplomatic charm offensive, notwithstanding the fact that Washington itself had pronounced Southeast Asia as the 8220;second front8221; in the war on terror.
India perhaps has gained the most from the war on terror, showcasing itself as a victim of international terrorism, making common cause with the US on the terrorist challenge posed by Taliban and Al Qaeda, strengthening its defence relations with the US and winning recognition from Washington as a de facto nuclear power, thereby moving significantly closer to the realisation of great power status.
Pakistan and the Philippines have secured increased US military and economic aid while Indonesia8217;s armed forces have restored military links with the US.
Yet, on closer reflection, many of the so-called gains have downsides and come with costs. Japan is less secure than before 9/11, not from the threat of terrorism, but from worsening relations with China brought about partly by Chinese fears of renewed Japanese militarism and North Korea8217;s march towards nuclear weapons capability, caused by heightened insecurity after it was dumped into the 8220;axis-of-evil8221; camp with Iraq and Iran.
China has lost influence in central Asia, where the US acquired a number of military facilities for its strike on the Taliban. This foray into China8217;s backyard undermined Beijing8217;s painstaking effort to develop a regional alliance of like-minded states through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, dedicated to fighting China8217;s three central strategic concerns: 8220;terrorism, separatism and extremism8221; and Beijing has developed the Shanghai group into a potential challenger to US hegemony in the region.
But China8217;s real loss is the strengthening of the US-India security partnership. The US decision to accord India the status of a de facto and legitimate nuclear power is a considerable setback for Beijing, which had joined hands with Washington to punish India for its nuclear tests in 1998. Moreover, the de-hyphenation of India and Pakistan in US strategic policy undermines China8217;s geopolitical strategy in South Asia, which had been centred on backing Pakistan to counter India.
Yet with the Republicans headed for a defeat in the approaching Congressional elections, serious doubts have emerged about the ratification of the US-India nuclear agreement by the Senate. This may unravel one of the main concrete benefits to India from the war on terror.
What about the US itself? The US today enjoys closer security relations in the East Asian region. For the first time in history, India and Pakistan are simultaneously strategic partners of the US and are prepared to follow its lead in world affairs. But America8217;s diplomatic gain is mainly at the government-to-government level. Its standing at the popular level in Asian societies has taken a beating, notwithstanding the goodwill generated by its extraordinary relief effort in the wake of the Indian Ocean tsunami. Sympathy for the US after the 9/11 attacks and declaratory support for its global war on terror have been undermined by the brute and unilateral exercise of US power, as evident in its attack on Iraq.
Moreover, closer security ties between the US and East Asian countries that are based on mutual need do not translate into genuine and heartfelt respect for American leadership in world affairs. Here the US has lost much ground as a superpower which could be trusted to make strategic choices backed by prudent calculations of costs and benefits of military action.
The post-9/11 geopolitics of East Asia consists not of winners and losers, but mostly losers. The biggest winners in the post-9/11 era are not states, but those societal forces who espouse and support the terrorist cause. They have been rejuvenated by the excesses of the global war on terror, from Guantanamo to Abu Ghraib to Beirut. It8217;s the war on terror, rather than terrorism itself, which has worsened Asia8217;s security environment.
The writer is deputy director, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and a senior fellow, Asia-Pacific Foundation, Canada