US, China, India

The violent backlash that has enveloped Pakistan since the Lal Masjid was stormed by security forces ten days ago shows no signs of abating. More than 160 people have died in a series of terrorist attacks all across Pakistan. On Thursday alone, 30 people were reportedly killed in two separate attacks, including one in Karachi apparently aimed at a bus carrying Chinese nationals. Even as Pervez Musharraf copes with the reaction from the religious extremists, who were once nurtured by the Pakistan army, he faces new pressures from two of Pakistan8217;s most important allies 8212; the United States and China. In their latest national intelligence estimate on the Al-Qaeda, the most comprehensive since 9/11, US agencies have collectively come to the conclusion that it has regrouped in the Pak-Afghan frontier and is gearing for a major attack against the US. Washington has finally acknowledged that Musharraf8217;s deal in 2006 with the militants in the federally administered tribal areas to keep out the Al-Qaeda has not worked.

China, Pakistan8217;s all-weather friend, is also compelling Pakistan to act against terrorism. After the Lal Masjid activists raided and detained Chinese workers at a massage parlour in Islamabad last month, Beijing8217;s ambassador to Pakistan, Luo Zhaohui, dispensed with diplomatic protocol to publicly demand action against militants. Thursday8217;s Karachi attacks make it quite clear that Chinese citizens in Pakistan will remain a soft target for the terrorists.

For the Indian security establishment it has never been too easy to analyse Pakistan on its own terms. Two decades of coping with cross-border terrorism, endless military tension and ceaseless diplomatic argumentation have made it even more difficult for India to be objective about Pakistan. It was much simpler, then, to see Pakistan as an unchanging black-box, for ever hostile to India. The current public debate in India has varied between the smug 8216;we told you so8217; and the cynical 8216;let Pakistan stew in its own juice8217;. Much of the 8216;toughness8217; of the Indian analysis on Pakistan tends to be a cover for defeatism. It is rooted in the assessment that India cannot in any way influence Pakistan8217;s internal evolution. The truth, however, is that India8217;s ability to make a difference to the pace and direction of change in Pakistan has never been as high as it is today. If India thinks dispassionately about the future of Pakistan, at one of its gravest moments, it would recognise and act on the importance of explicit support to Musharraf and other moderate forces in Pakistan.