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Journalism of Courage
With the triangular relationship among India, the United States, and Pakistan delicately poised, it is in the interest of all the three parties not to drop the ball now. The triangular interaction in New York last month among the leaders of the three countries underlined the reality that mis-steps in one set of relations could undermine the others.
Having achieved the near impossible 8212; a simultaneous improvement of relations with both India and Pakistan over the last five years 8212; the Bush administration ought to be extra-careful that what it does with Pakistan does not harm either Indo-US relations or the Indo-Pak peace process.
While cautioning the Bush administration against muddying the peace process with Pakistan and urging Islamabad not to overplay its hand on Kashmir, India should recognise its own responsibility to move the peace process forward.
When External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh meets Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf today, he has the challenging task of putting the New York debacle behind and coming up with a better understanding on how to make simultaneous progress on both cross-border terrorism and Kashmir.
Thanks to a deliberate policy of de-hyphenating relations with India and Pakistan, avoiding a tilt towards either on Indo-Pak issues and maintaining pressure on Islamabad to end cross-border terrorism, the Bush administration created a sound basis for expanding ties with both, as well as creating a conducive environment for the Indo-Pak peace process.
But in New York last month, the Bush administration was sharply reminded that its actions and statements 8212; though well-meaning 8212; could easily undo the tight-rope walking it has managed so far in the subcontinent.
Suggestions from senior Bush administration officials that India should take additional steps on Kashmir to make life easier for Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf produced the opposite effect. Similarly, in a probable miscalculation of his new standing in Washington, Musharraf over-reached on Kashmir in his meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. A peeved India in turn held back on taking the next logical steps in the peace process.
In New York, both Singh and Musharraf had conveyed their respective concerns about the peace process to President George W. Bush. Singh8217;s emphasis was on Pakistan taking additional steps to curb cross-border terrorism and Musharraf in turn focused on India moving forward on Kashmir. Musharraf8217;s decision to raise the issue in the United Nations just hours before he met Singh for dinner, had provoked Indian anger and prevented the New York meeting from being productive. The Pakistan side8217;s unfortunate attempt at specifying where troop reductions could take place in Kashmir 8212; Kupwara and Baramulla were mentioned 8212; prevented a naturally irate India from moving down a path it had already chosen.
Since then, all sides have had the opportunity to review the state of the triangular relationship. Both India and Pakistan sought to downplay the impression that the New York talks between Singh and Musharraf were a failure. External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh, who stayed back in New York after Prime Minister Manmohan Singh8217;s departure, has had an opportunity to discuss the Pakistan question in some depth with US officials.
In late September, Pakistan8217;s national security adviser 8212; Tariq Aziz 8212; was in Washington for a comprehensive discussion that included the domestic scene in Pakistan as well as ties with India. A few days later US National Security Adviser Steve Hadley was in Pakistan and Afghanistan revisiting the multi-dimensional US-Pakistan relations, including the India factor.
As India, Pakistan, and the US struggle to manage their triangular relationship, they need to effectively calibrate a variety of different national concerns. These include the American interest in Musharraf8217;s political future, Indian apprehensions about the credibility of Musharraf8217;s steps against terrorism, Musharraf8217;s fear that India will string out Pakistan on Kashmir, the continuing instability in Afghanistan, and the links between extremists in the subcontinent and global terrorism.
India8217;s desire for a rapid conclusion of the procedures necessary for the implementation of the nuclear pact signed in July and the unfolding nuclear crisis in Iran have added yet another layer of complexity to the triangular relationship.
The talk in Washington on selling 77 F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan, Islamabad8217;s pressure on Washington to extend nuclear energy cooperation to it on terms similar to those being offered to India, add to the dynamism in the triangular ties.
In response to new concerns in New Delhi that Washington is taking a softer approach to Musharraf, the Bush administration has tried to clarify matters. Fully aware that its low-key approach to the Indo-Pak peace process has been one of the reasons for its successful South Asia policy, Washington has now reaffirmed that it has no intention to inject itself into the Indo-Pak dialogue. While recognising the dangers of trying to rush the peace process forward, the Bush administration is underlining the importance of a number of new steps that Musharraf has taken against terrorism in recent weeks.
Besides cracking down on cross-border terrorism in J038;K, Musharraf is believed to have restructured the ISI apparatus that deals with Kashmir and has made some decisions of long-term significance to the Indo-Pak peace process and the global war against terrorism.
Unlike in 2001, when Musharraf did take some cosmetic steps against the sources of terrorism in Pakistan, Washington believes he is more serious this time. One reason for this might be that the very forces responsible for terrorism in Kashmir are also the ones trying to get at Musharraf himself. The US is also concerned that many involved in Kashmir terrorism also have links with larger networks of terrorism operating in the Western world.
India has said at the highest levels in recent days, if there is credible and sustained evidence of the reduction in cross-border terrorism, India would be prepared to consider troop reductions in Jammu and Kashmir. Finding ways to make this, and a range of other bold reciprocal steps, happen should be at the top of agenda in the Natwar Singh-Musharraf exchange in Islamabad.
