This semi-final was a goalless draw

This time the Hurriyat moderates had decided not to press 8212; as they had in September 8212; for 8216;8216;side issues8217;8217; like release of prisoners or the human rights situation and focus only on the solution of the larger Kashmir issue. The Centre couldn8217;t do much but ask the Hurriyat to return with a mechanism.

And as these talks were being held in the backdrop of the massacres at Doda and Udhampur, it was impossible for Centre to make even a symbolic gesture to help the Hurriyat salvage its image back home.

So when the Hurriyat returned to the Valley, they were left with nothing concrete to offer to their constituency.

It8217;s all a long way from the September talks, the first such meeting held by the UPA. It was a renewal of New Delhi8217;s efforts to bring Kashmiri separatists to the table, especially as an earlier process had completely derailed after the change of guard at the Centre. And the separatists had joined this process, risking both their lives and reputation. Mirwaiz8217;s uncle was killed, his house attacked to halt the Hurriyat participation and they were publicly branded as 8216;8216;traitors8217;8217;.

The first round of Hurriyat-PM dialogue was, at the time, taken as a serious effort as it was being held in the backdrop of a major shift in Pakistan8217;s Kashmir policy. President Musharraf had already shunned Pakistan8217;s traditional position and dumped United Nations resolutions for a discussion on 8216;8216;out of the box8217;8217; solutions on the principle of consensus between New Delhi, Islamabad and the Kashmiri leadership.

Pakistan had also taken a public position, denouncing violence and even banning Jihadi groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. The infiltration across the Line of Control too had dropped to its lowest ebb ever since insurgency erupted in Kashmir in 1990.

In this season of flexibility and accommodation on Kashmir, Hurriyat moderates had, in fact, become a consensus partner for a dialogue for both New Delhi and Islamabad. It certainly had provided the Centre with a rare opportunity to push forth a serious peace process, secure an effective ceasefire on ground and bring relief to the people.

Yet when the Hurriyat and the Prime Minister met on Wednesday, it was with the the Centre8217;s Kashmir process in a total mess. And though the Prime Minister described the talks as a 8216;8216;meeting of minds8217;8217;, it was viewed as nothing more than yet another photo op, having no bearing on the ground situation and bringing no relief to the people.

The reasons are clear: Following the last meeting, there was a lot of expectation that Centre would take at least some immediate measures to start the healing process. But once the Hurriyat returned to Srinagar, there was no follow-up as expected; rather, the Centre started expanding the process.

Soon separatist leaders outside the Hurriyat were approached for individual engagements which led to Singh8217;s meeting with Sajjad Lone and, later, JKLF supremo Yasin Malik. This expanded the Kashmir dialogue to include a major chunk of the separatist leadership in Kashmir, leaving out only hardline leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani8217;s Hurriyat and militants from the process.

This was in itself an achievement for the Centre but the government took no measures to help sustain the enthusiasm. The process remained fragmented and while the Centre talked to a few more separatist leaders, the Hurriyat8217;s second round was delayed for months. Lone talked of an institutionalization of the dialogue process while Malik had emphasized that he wants Kashmiris to get a place on the Indo-Pak table and this individual engagement too was not followed up.

Instead, the Centre came up with another process and held a Kashmir roundtable in February, inviting almost everybody from mainstream political groups, Kashmiri pandit organisations and separatists of all hues and colours in February. The separatists, however, stayed away, turning it into a meeting between the Prime Minister and J-K politicians who do not disagree with the most difficult question: Kashmir8217;s future within the Indian union.

The Centre8217;s announcement of the Srinagar roundtable was an attempt at keeping this new process relevant, and to ensure separatist participation. The separatists especially the Hurriyat moderates had shown little interest to join a roundtable as it only overshadowed their own direct talks with the Prime Minister.

And, as the date for the Srinagar roundtable approached, New Delhi suddenly remembered the second round of the PM8217;s direct talks with Hurriyat moderates and invited them to New Delhi.

Much of the confusion surrounding New Delhi8217;s Kashmir peace process stems from the fact that the Centre is engaging individually with the separatists parallel to the all-party roundtables. A roundtable involving all shades of political opinion in J038;K should have been a culmination of a process, not held at this premature stage.

The confusion begs several questions: Why did government rush through so many parallel processes on Kashmir? Why did it not try to talk to militants, especially the indigenous Hizbul Mujahideen, which could help to ensure a ceasefire on the ground? Why the rush to get mainstream parties into the dialogue process when there is not much of a disagreement with them on the basic issue?Nobody knows.

muzamil.jaleelexpressindia.com