This doctrine is full of holes

India's draft nuclear doctrine is unusual in three respects. First, no other nuclear power has expounded its nuclear doctrine before all ...

India8217;s draft nuclear doctrine is unusual in three respects. First, no other nuclear power has expounded its nuclear doctrine before all the actual nuclear weapon pieces were already in place. Most of the others first accumulated nuclear weapons and then developed their doctrines based on their arsenals. For instance, the US which has used and possessed nuclear weapons since 1945 did not have any doctrine until 1948 and even then it was a rudimentary doctrine that continued until 1961. Second, most nuclear doctrines, unlike the Indian one, are not known for their verbosity. They tend to be just documents outlining broad principles of use and non-use of nuclear weapons. The British and Chinese doctrines are good examples. Third, nuclear doctrines normally deal with the deployment of nuclear arsenals. They never advocate abolition. The draft Indian nuclear doctrine deals with not only complete nuclear disarmament but also nuclear war fighting.

The drafters of the document proudly proclaim that India hasreversed the pro-cess followed by other nuclear weapons states but shy away from explaining why it was necessary to do so. One possible explanation is that this hold-all8217; approach was necessary to accommodate the divergent views of the members of the National Security Advisory Board NSAB in general and the drafting committee in particular. Another possible explanation is that the document is deliberately detailed because it attempts to cover every possible contingency that may arise. However, the Indian doctrine leaves several crucial questions unanswered.

For instance, the document states that India will pursue a 8220;doctrine of credible minimum deterrence8221; and then elaborates that these 8220;forces will be based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets8221;. Does this me-an that unless a triad is in position India will not possess a 8220;minimum credible deterrence8221;?

If that is the case, then, given that an operational sea-based deterrence capability is unlikely for at leastanother two decades or so, India does not possess a 8220;credible minimum deterrence8221; posture at present. This is not only contradictory to previous statements but also raises doubts about the credibility of India8217;s nuclear deterrence.

Similarly, the consensus document categorically declares a no-first-use posture. While this is normally understood as the ability to absorb a nuclear strike first and then to retaliate with a second nuclear strike capability, it does not address a conventional contingency. For example, were an adversary to launch an attack on India8217;s nuclear forces using conventional means, would it be regarded as a first use, thus giving India the right to retaliate with its second strike nuclear capability? In which case, would it not be a violation of the no-first-use posture? Or would India confine itself to a conventional response? Alternatively, how would India respond to an attack that uses other weapons of mass destruction against its nuclear assets? Would it respond with nuclear orconventional means? These are some of the vital issues that the doctrine fails to address. On the other hand it is not clear whether the no-first-use posture prohibits India from using its own conventional capabilities to attack an adversary8217;s nuclear arsenal.

Perhaps the biggest deficiency in the document is that it appears to be totally disconnected from the strategic defence review exercise, which should have set the stage for the doctrine, rather than the other way round. Indeed, the doctrines of most other nuclear weapons states are elaborated as part of their regular strategic defence reviews.

Moreover, the assumption that India can afford the economic cost of building and maintaining a nuclear triad and a highly effective conventional military capabilities needs to be further scrutinised. The doctrine calls for a lively debate, a debate beyond the confines of the usual seminar rooms in New Delhi.

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The writer is a research fellow at the Centre for International Studies, Oxford