The war that never was

One has to search for the truth amid these diametrically opposed views. To begin with, Kargil is not a good example for the advocates of limited war. Here, we were fighting within our own territory to throw out a transgressor. The world community had recognised Pakistan as the violator and was on India8217;s side all along as we sought to evict the enemy. The situation would, surely, be different if we were inside Pakistani territory, occupying its lands. Almost certainly, the same pressures would be brought to bear upon us to get out. It is also not a very smart suggestion to overcome such restraints by undertaking 8216;salami slicing8217; operations. This implies that the adversary cannot, or will not, do the same to us. While their ability to do this might be less than ours, they surely have the will and the capacity to retaliate. Escalation of conflict is inevitable and Clinton8217;s theorem that boundaries and LoCs cannot be violated through force would come into play. If it applied to Pakistan in 1999, when we had applauded this dictum, how can it not apply to us now?

At the same time, to argue that war is not an option makes even less sense. To make or threaten war is one of the instruments of power of a nation state and to rule it out as an option is both unwise and irrational. The business of statecraft is to make this instrument usable, if necessary. If war was an option in 1971, and let us not confuse ourselves by believing that it came about in response to Pakistan8217;s preemptive air strikes, then it must be available as an option now. It became possible then because, in a masterstroke of statecraft, Indira Gandhi configured and signed the Indo-Soviet Peace and Cooperation Treaty in August, 1971. It gave Mrs Gandhi the 8216;space8217; to pursue her objectives to a logical conclusion. But for this, the pressures mounted by the US and China may not have been easy to counter. So, if we need a military option today or in the future, our statesmen have to do something similar. This time, though, Russia is very much a part of the US-led global community. So, the 8216;realpolitik8217; game can only be played with America. Our ability to use limited war as an option is, thus, more a function of the US equation, and less that of the nuclearised environment.

It is here that we are in some difficulty. As things stand, there is nothing that we can offer the US in exchange for what we want. Musharraf is too crucial an ally until America turns away from Afghanistan and focuses elsewhere. But when that happens, things could be different. Pakistan would no longer be as relevant to US interests as it is today. Musharraf knows that he has limited time. The resurgence of pro-Taliban and anti-American parties in the recent elections has not occurred accidentally or without the general8217;s involvement. He is also playing his cards adroitly. His safety and survival lies in America remaining engaged in Pakistan which it will if al Qaeda, or forces sympathetic to it, are seen to be flourishing in Pakistan.

The other constraint which has prevented us from being proactive is that we do not enjoy the type of asymmetry in military power against our adversary that we need to have. Without decisive superiority, it is just not feasible to undertake punitive measures of any real value. Mobilisations, such as those enforced in the last year, are not going to serve any purpose other than those of vested political interests, sadly using the armed forces as a convenient pawn.

In this background, two things assume importance. First, America must disengage from our neighbourhood and turn its attention elsewhere in its fight against terrorism. This alone can give us the political space for exercising a military option. Second, we must create a decisively stronger military capability versus the adversary. Whether war can or will help solve the Kashmir problem is a different matter but, at least, the use of military power as an option, would be restored. At the moment, and in the foreseeable future, our hand is weak. Nothing can be gained by continuously bemoaning America8217;s pampering of Musharraf or its inability to see the wood for the trees. It is presumptuous to claim that our terrorists should be their terrorists. After all, we are not able to equate the Palestine freedom fighters with the people who are on a killing spree in Kashmir. It is just that in the achievement of their near-term objectives, Pakistan figures prominently in US calculations and unless this picture changes, India will not have the desired space in which a military option can be exercised.

Finally, in this new age of globalised economies and technology explosion, war for territorial gains is simply passe. But it can still be a weapon of coercion provided there is military capability and astute statesmanship to create the required political space. In the Indo-Pak context, it is most unlikely that such an environment can be created in the foreseeable future and, therefore, our wars will continue to be the wars that never were.

The writer has served as director general, Defence Planning Staff