The second hijack

The services of a Special Frontier Force para-commando unit, raised in 1989 for counter-terrorism and stationed half-way between Amritsar and Lucknow near Saharanpur, were not utilised. Mandated to be on 24-hour alert, equipped with a helicopter for rapid deployment and under the R038;AW, the group 8212; led by a lieutenant colonel of the Army8217;s 9 Para Commandos 8212; was not once called into action to vacate the hijacking at Raja Sansi. Why? The fact is that no one in the security top brass knew that such a specialist force existed. The net result was that NSG commandos had to be flown from Delhi on the basis of a decision of the Crisis Management Group that met nearly 2 hours and 15 minutes after the hijack alert. It is a matter of record now that precious time was wasted in contacting the CMG members as the telephone numbers listed were dated. The NSG did land at Amritsar eventually but by then the aircraft was out of India and flying towards Lahore. The SFF8217;s Vikas unit is living reminder of that blunder.

The hijackers also exposed the counter-hijacking preparedness at Amritsar airport. Amritsar had already seen a couple of hijackings, but the police, para-military forces and air traffic control were surprised into inaction for the full 48 minutes that the plane was on the tarmac 8212; between 7.01 pm to 7.49 pm. With all the possible logistical support at hand, the security forces bumbled along without recourse to any standard operating procedure. No attempt was made to approach the aircraft from the rear the hijackers were in the cockpit and immobilise the aircraft. A weak attempt was made by putting a fuel bowser in front of the aircraft but this was circumvented by the pilot, with a gun pointed to his head. Even today, many of our airports are not prepared to handle such an emergency.

Emergency is a function of response and time. Delayed response is no response as was evident on that day. And it was also evident on December 26, 2004, when India8217;s southern coast was struck by a tsunami, when the government swung into action a full hour after the air force informed it about the inundation of the Car Nicobar base. The CMG, of course, met at 1 pm 8212; five hours after India8217;s island territories went under water. The point is, security instruments, howsoever efficient and expensive, will lose their critical efficacy if they are not integrated into the system through periodic use and control.

But before we address the Indian response, it still remains a matter of concern that a hijacking was just not anticipated. The then home minister, L.K. Advani, articulated in great detail the complicity of the Pakistani embassy in Kathmandu. But how come our intelligence agencies never got wind of the conspiracy? After all, Harkat-ul-Ansar ideologue Maulana Masood Azhar had openly told his interrogators that he would soon escape the Kot Bhalwal jail after his comrade, Sajjad Afghani, was gunned down in June 1999. It is a matter of record that a senior Indian intelligence operative, related to the then NSG chief, was on board the aircraft and was oblivious to the drama that later played out.

That New Delhi has failed to learn from its errors is evident from the fact that the then R038;AW station chief in Nepal now heads India8217;s external intelligence. The lesson in this is that Indian agencies need to be more pro-active as law and order is not an intelligence paradigm. Masood Azhar and his hijacker brother, Ibrahim Athar, still pose a threat to the country and are believed to be behind the attacks on Ayodhya, Varanasi, Delhi and possibly Mumbai. Intelligence agencies appear to be content to solve the cases rather than prevent them.

If security and intelligence were found wanting that day, Indian diplomacy fared no better. The Indian state8217;s inability to leverage its power through diplomatic means was revealed during the hijack. For virtually the entire week, the NDA council of ministers, including Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh, could not bring international pressure to bear on Pakistan or Dubai or the Taliban in order to vacate the hijacking. The fact was that the Indian ambassador was not even allowed to enter the Al Minhad air force base in Dubai, where the hijacked plane refuelled before heading to Kandahar. To make matters worse, Jaswant Singh widened the canvas of vulnerability by landing up at Kandahar to bring back the hostages. So many years later, Indian diplomacy is still to effectively channel international pressure on Pakistan over terrorism.

And, do remember, the IC-814 hijackers had demanded the release of 36 of their colleagues and the body of Sajjad Afghani as ransom. Ultimately Azhar, Mushtaq Zargar and Omer Sayeed Sheikh were exchanged for 161 hostages on December 31, 1999 in Kandahar. The other 33 identified Pakistanis are still languishing as undertrials and awaiting conviction in Indian jails. The very thought should send shivers through the Indian establishment.