The race to the right?

But lawyers who represented the black schoolchildren in the Brown case said that several justices in the majority had misinterpreted the positions they had taken in the litigation and had misunderstood the true meaning of Brown.

And as those reactions make clear, the decision has reignited a societal debate in the United States about the role of race in education that will almost certainly prompt divisive lawsuits around the country. Indeed, the decision has invited a fundamental reassessment of Brown itself, perhaps the most important Supreme Court decision of the 20th century.

8220;There is a historic clash between two dramatically different visions not only of Brown,8221; said Laurence H. Tribe, a law professor at Harvard, 8220;but also the meaning of the Constitution.8221;

The four conservatives on the court said Brown and the 14th Amendment8217;s equal protection clause required the government to be colourblind in making decisions about placing students in public schools in all circumstances. The four liberals said Brown meant to allow school districts to take account of race to achieve integration.

In the middle was Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, whose concurring opinion, at once idiosyncratic, enigmatic and decisive, was perhaps the least engaged with Brown, saying little more than that the case 8220;should teach us that the problem before us defies8221; an 8220;easy solution8221;. Justice Kennedy8217;s concurrence, which split the court 4-1-4 on a crucial point, sharply limited the role race could play in school assignments but did not forbid school districts from taking account of race entirely.

Charles J. Ogletree Jr., a law professor at Harvard and an authority on Brown and its aftermath, applauded that concurrence. 8220;The hidden story in the decision today is that Justice Kennedy refused to follow the lead of the other four justices in eviscerating the legacy of Brown,8221; said Ogletree.

Writing for the other four justices in the majority, Chief Justice Roberts took a harder line. In an unusual effort to cement his interpretation of Brown, he quoted from the transcript of the 1952 argument in the case.

8220;We have one fundamental contention,8221; a lawyer for the schoolchildren, Robert L. Carter, had told the court more than a half-century ago. 8220;No state has any authority under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in affording educational opportunities among its citizens.8221;

But the man who made that statement, now a 90-year-old senior federal judge in Manhattan, disputed the chief justice8217;s characterisation. 8220;All that race was used for at that point in time was to deny equal opportunity to black people,8221; Judge Carter said of the 1950s. 8220;It8217;s to stand that argument on its head to use race the way they use is now.8221;

Jack Greenberg, who worked on the Brown case for the plaintiffs and is now a law professor at Columbia, called the chief justice8217;s interpretation 8220;preposterous.8221;

8220;The plaintiffs in Brown were concerned with the marginalisation and subjugation of black people,8221; Professor Greenberg said. 8220;They said you can8217;t consider race, but that8217;s how race was being used.8221;

William T. Coleman Jr., another lawyer who worked on Brown, said, 8220;The majority opinion is 100 per cent wrong.8221; 8220;It8217;s dirty pool,8221; said Coleman, a Washington lawyer who served as secretary of transportation in the Ford administration, 8220;to say that the people Brown was supposed to protect are the people it8217;s now not going to protect.8221;

But Roger Clegg, the president and general counsel of the Center for Equal Opportunity, a research group in the Washington area that supports colour blind government policies, disagreed, saying the majority honoured history in its decision.

8220;There is no question but that the principle of Brown is that a child8217;s skin colour should not determine what school he or she should be assigned to,8221; Clegg said.

Chief Justice Roberts wrote that Brown not only supported but also required Thursday8217;s decision striking down student assignment plans in Seattle and Louisville, Ky., meant to ensure racially balanced schools.

Justice John Paul Stevens, in dissent, said Chief Justice Roberts8217;s discussion of Brown 8220;rewrites the history of one of this court8217;s most important decisions.8221; Justice Stephen G. Breyer, also dissenting, said the opinion 8220;undermines Brown8217;s promise of integrated primary and secondary education8221; and 8220;threatens to substitute for present calm a disruptive round of race-related litigation.8221;

Professor Greenberg said he was also wary of the reaction to Thursday8217;s decision. 8220;Following Brown, there was massive resistance8221; that lasted some 15 years, he said. 8220;This is essentially the rebirth of massive resistance in more acceptable form.8221;

Clegg, by contrast, said the decision8217;s practical consequences should be minimal. 8220;Kennedy does leave the door open to some degree of consideration of race,8221; he said, 8220;but it8217;s not very clear what that would be.8221; As a consequence, Clegg said, most prudent school districts would shy from any use of race in assigning students for fear of costly and disruptive litigation.

Professor Greenberg suggested that more than law was at play in yesterday8217;s decision. 8220;You can8217;t really say that five justices are so smart that they can read the law and precedents and four others can8217;t,8221; he said. 8220;Something else is going on.8221;