
Rouglhy every six months, New Delhi goes into an almighty tizzy over whether Atal Bihari Vajpayee and L.K. Advani are still an item. It begins when somebody does an item number, this past fortnight the hapless task falling on the very broad shoulders of BJP President M. Venkaiah Naidu. Next the prime minister throws a fit. The BJP passes a series of resolutions declaring unflinching faith in 8220;the leadership of Atalji8221;.
Following this, unimaginative reporters quote unnamed NDA ministers as saying the coalition will only survive as long as Vajpayee is prime minister. Murli Manohar Joshi issues a statement in support of, in effect, himself. Finally Advani denies he is in the running for the top job.
Given this rather comic and predictable drama, it is easy to lose sight of first principles. Take Venkaiah Naidu8217;s definition of Vajpayee as Vikas Purush Development Icon 8212; later amended to Shikkhar Purush Towering Personality 8212; and of Advani as Lauh Purush Iron Man. It is unlikely the BJP chief was merely indulging neological instincts. Rather, he was setting the parameters for the October 2004 Lok Sabha election campaign.
This leads to a key question: Does the rest of the party, not to speak of BJP affiliates, share this optimism about Vajpayee and Advani? For that matter, does Venkaiah Naidu believe his own slogans?
To try and answer those questions, journey back to the early days of the NDA government and to the motivations of the two men who lead it. Doing so will also explain the complex chemistry between the prime minister and his deputy, at least as much has been evident in public life.
When he took over in March 1998, Vajpayee was obviously determined not to meet the fate of his immediate predecessors, the accidental prime ministers called H.D. Deve Gowda and Inder Gujral. Every previous non-Congress prime ministry had begun with euphoria and ended in a confused heap. At the zenith of a dignified and distinguished political career, Vajpayee didn8217;t want to make those mistakes.
Advani saw political office as an opportunity for the party to take its next big leap. In terms of parliamentary opposition, mass movement, agitprop, the BJP had proved itself; governance was the final test.
The two approaches, Vajpayee8217;s and Advani8217;s, were neither synonymous nor mutually exclusive. Personal aspiration 8212; to become the first non-Congress prime minister to leave a positive stamp 8212; and party accretion could happily feed each other.
Somewhere along the line, longevity became an end in itself.
This has not been without benefit. It has ensured that, whatever the periodic frustrations and exertions of his friends, Advani will not take on his boss. Corporate loyalty uber alles.
Yes, the two are very different men. During their individual party presidencies, they ran two very different BJPs. True, at times Vajpayee seems to take Advani for granted, the most recent prime ministerial sulk being a case in point. Yet if Advani has resolutely stuck to the number two slot and refused to rock the boat, one has to simply respect his decision.
The Vajpayee vs Advani struggle is silent, subterranean, gradual. It is not a hell-for-leather prizefight; certainly there is no desire to make it Morarji Desai vs Charan Singh, Reloaded.
It is now fairly clear Vajpayee will stay in office till October 2004. Advani would only want to become prime minister if, in an emotionally-charged vision senior Sangh members share, Vajpayee voluntarily steps down and anoints him successor. Chances of that happening are somewhere between zero and minus one.
It is tempting to see the Vajpayee-Advani tension as one between a moderate and a hardline purist. Over the past five years at least, there has been little empirical evidence of this. To the party faithful, both Advani and Vajpayee are guilty of the same error of judgement, of succumbing to the belief that good governance is necessarily divorced from ideology and political positioning.
There is some merit in that argument, despite Naidu8217;s touching faith in his leaders8217; 8220;achievements8221;. This government8217;s biggest success has been forging a new relationship with America. Yet foreign policy rarely has a domestic electoral spin.
That George W. Bush shared a table with Vajpayee or Don Rumsfeld met Advani on a Sunday will not excite voters in Gorakhpur. India8217;s Pakistan policy may be packaged as 8220;innovative8221;, as diplomacy defined by 8220;the element of surprise8221;. From the grassroots, it is plain inconsistent. Neither is the 8220;Iron Man8221; appellation as easily lapped up as it used to be.
Move to political management. In Uttar Pradesh, the decline and fall of the BJP was triggered by Delhi-encouraged factionalism. There, as in Karnataka and Bihar earlier, the central leadership forced the state unit into suicidal grand alliances. Coalition building is the new orthodoxy, curbing distinctive characteristics. The only state the BJP won resoundingly was Gujarat, with an appeal crafted almost in defiance of Advani and Vajpayee.
Indian electorates rarely vote on a government8217;s deeds. An election is not an administrative referendum; it is an inherently political exercise. In office, the BJP has consistently deprived itself of one political theme after another. It has reached a situation where sections of the RSS and almost all of the VHP find themselves alienated from the government.
It is nobody case that the RSS is a perfect body. It has its anachronisms and angularities. Neither is it possible to concede every VHP demand. Even so they constitute crucial sources of mobilisation for the BJP. Brushing aside the proverbial 8220;hotheads8221; may please Lodi Garden liberals. Does it serve the BJP?
Praise Vajpayee, ignore Advani, or do the reverse. You can8217;t escape the needling query: What is the BJP8217;s political platform for the next election? Venkaiah Purush has 17 months to respond.