The blunder and after

Indeed, a proactive policy8217; on terrorism has been at the centre of the political debate for over two years now, and the political executive has obviously given an unequivocal mandate for the evolution of such a policy and the institutional set-up to implement it. That they have been ill-served by those who have been tasked to advice on and implement this mandate is more than evident from the fact that the nation lacks a contingency plan and a policy perspective even for the most conventional and basic of terrorist threats a hostage situation.

Had an unambiguous and uncompromising policy been articulated well in advance and not under the shadow of a crisis clearly stating that there could be no concessions and that there would be exemplary punitive action in any hostage situation, the present terrorist group may not as easily have been tempted to test this government8217;s mettle.

Evidently, the very idea of proactivity8217; has not been understood by those who are required toforge it into the nuts and bolts of an effective system of response. If proactivity is not to be reduced to a mere political slogan, what precisely does it mean?

To take the present example, it would, in addition to the articulation of a general policy, require the translation of such a policy into a range of drills and protocols that would automatically be activated on the first reports of a hijack or hostage situation. We find, however, that when the plane landed at Amritsar, over two hours after the hijack had been discovered, the State government8217;s Crisis Management Group 8212; such a body does exist in each State, though I doubt that any such entity has performed a useful function in the recent past 8212; had still not been activated, nor had the Command Centre set up at the highest levels at Delhi organised itself sufficiently to give clear directions on the course of action to be taken.

Everything depended on the district officials who 8212; in the absence of clear guidelines 8212; simply succumbed to thepressure of the terrorists8217; claim that they had killed four hostages. And this is despite the emerging evidence that the National Security Advisors had advocated a hardline from the very outset.

Proactivity8217; would also require a wider interpretation of crisis management. Two other aspects of the current crisis that stand out is the extent of disinformation circulated, and often endorsed, by various individuals associated with the government, and the abject failure to effectively handle the human relations problem raised by the families of the hostages.

Each rumour, including the grossly exaggerated reports of the arms carried by the hijackers, the supposed multiple killings at Amritsar, and conflicting versions of the role of the Pakistan and Taliban governments, were given wide circulation from time to time, as officials spoke in a hundred different voices, feeding the hysteria of the relatives, and the frenzy of the media. There is enormous need to have a single, authentic source of the officialposition in such situations 8212; though this does not mean the conventional bureaucrat with a two-point agenda: disclose nothing and justify everything the government does. It means, rather, an authoritative, well-trained and well-informed source, with the ability to distinguish between confirmed information and surmise. Equally, a system of providing an immediate channel of information and relief to the relatives of the hostages should have been activated.

Of course, it is important to point out that the conduct of a section of the relatives themselves was nothing less than disgraceful. All security personnel are routinely expected to uncomplainingly confront, and thousands have lost their lives fighting the terrorist scourge. Apart from the transient sentimentalism of the public response to Kargil, the pain of their families is not even acknowledged. The fact, however, is that terrorism does not recognise the boundaries of conventional warfare, and treats both combatants and not-combatants alike, as a meansto its own ends. It is high time that the civilian population8217; 8212; read, the privileged and articulate groups who travel by plane realised that, in a nation under siege, their privileges do not extend to an immunity from terror.

In this context, one may recall the terrorist campaign against Israel in the wake of the Yom Kippur War, when, in the months of April and May 1974, a large number of children became the targets of a succession of terrorist attacks. In the worst of such incidents at a school in the village of Ma8217;alot, more than 100 children were held hostage by Arab terrorists armed with Kalashnikovs and explosives. Despite the innocence and vulnerability of the hostages, the Israel Defence Force stormed the schoolhouse after a fourteen-hour stand off. The terrorists opened indiscriminate fire on their young hostages, hitting eighty-four of them, of whom 20 died. It was a frightful price to pay. But in the war against terror, the price of capitulation is even greater.

Proactivity, however, doesnot just mean protocols for hostage situations. It requires the identification of all possible forms of terrorist attacks 8212; irrespective of their momentary probability 8212; and the preparation of comprehensive range of operative, defensive and punitive measures to confront and combat these. To take an example: it is now clear that Kashmiri terrorists have, or shortly will have, access to chemical weapons, and will eventually and inevitably use these. I am certain that not even the most preliminary attempt has been made to identify the nation8217;s response in the event of their use.

Kargil, the continuing attacks on security forces in Jamp;K, and the general air of disbelief and shock that greets each new escalation of terrorist violence or new generation of arms and technologies accessed by the extremists, suggest that that exercise to identify potential or emerging dangers, and to proactively8217; evolve appropriate systems and protocols has not been carried out, or even, perhaps, envisaged. There must now be aclear recognition that we are no longer confronted with low-intensity conflict8217;, but with a full scale 8212; albeit undeclared 8211; war, and a corresponding urgency must attend our actions.

The author is a former DGP, Punjab