Talk to US, despite Pakistan

India has been active in engaging the US at both the governmental and non-governmental levels since the autumn of 1998especially so after the conflict at Kargil. Leaving aside the series of talks between Jaswant Singh with Madeleine Albright, Sandy Burger and Strobe Talbot, MEA officials led by K. Raghunath have held a number of discussions with their counterparts in Delhi and Washington. Members of our strategic think-tanks and the National Security Advisory Board have held talks on the entire range of issues impacting on Indo-US relations, since September.

Pakistan looms large in the Indian foreign policy psyche not only bilaterally in relation to that country, but as a factor by which we judge the attitudes and policies of other countries towards India, particularly the US. There are indications that our foreign policy establishment and political analysts are disappointed and consequently critical about the subdued US criticism of the coup and policy pronouncements indicating an inclination on the part of the US to deal with Musharraf in a practical manner. If the US is to be judged on the basis of the stated norms ofits foreign policy, our disappointment and criticism are valid.

Indications are that the US is willing to constructively engage the military junta in Pakistan, which is involved with religious extremism and cross border terrorism, which overthrew an elected government, which was responsible for serious destablisation of peace and stability in South Asia by indulging in the misadventure of Kargil and which has violated all democratic norms. The willingness is in clear contradiction of the norms spelt out thus: 8220;That a state should let its people choose their leaders by elections, that it should derive strength and cohesion from the diversity of its population, that it should protect the rights of minorities, especially those of the ultimate minority, the individual citizen. In short, to be successful and strong, to survive and prosper, a state should be a liberal democracy8230;.the way foreign leaders behave within their own borders has a direct bearing on the way they behave towards othercountries8230;.Regimes that rely on force in dealing with their own people are predisposed to commit aggression against their neighbours.8221; This is what Deputy Secretary of State of the US Talbot asserted in his speech on the Balkan question at the ASPEN Institute on August 24.

Will the adoption of a confrontationist attitude vis-a-vis the US, in responses to its policy on Pakistan, however, serve India8217;s national interests? It is on the answer to this important question that we have to structure our policies within the framework of political realities. In the basic orientations of its foreign policy, the US remains committed to democracy, good governance and human rights. But, this general orientation is subject to flexibilities and adjustments in terms of practicalities and US interests. To Washington, Pakistan is an important country in its own right. Its geostrategic position lends it that importance. Its population of nearly 140 million and its emergence as a nuclear-weapons state adds to thisimportance. Pakistan, as a potential catalyst for regional destabilisation and religious extremism, has also become negatively important. These are the factors behind the US inclination to deal with Musharraf.

Even we, despite our stronger aversion to Musharraf8217;s government, have indicated our willingness to resume our dialogue with Pakistan. Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh has clearly stated that India will be willing to deal with whichever government has effective control of Pakistan. This is a correct and practical approach. Why then should we adopt a John Foster Dulleslike approach to the US, suggesting that, if it is not with us on this phase of Pakistani developments, it is against us?

Instead, we should note that the US has asked Musharraf to extend his promise regarding CBMs to the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. The US has also expressed disappointment about Musharraf not giving a time-frame for restoring democracy in Pakistan. We should also remember that India8217;s present equations withworld powers are not underpinned by stable leverages. Our relations with China are subject to undercurrents of reservations. Our relations with the Russian Federation are subject to the limitation of the domestic uncertainties of that country and the Euro-centricity of its foreign policy because of Russian dependence on the West. Our relations with Japan remain distant and those with Germany, the UK and France would be subject to the chemistry of our relations with the US.

Calibrating a stable working relationship with all these powers, specially the US, is important to meet our interests. Being unilaterally prescriptive and critical in absolutist terms cannot serve this purpose. That President Clinton may not visit Pakistan during his planned South Asia tour is a substantively critical signal to the military rulers of that country.

The more critical factors which will impinge on the future course of Indo-US relations are issues relating to the CTBT and the Millennium negotiations at the WTO. With the USSenate refusing ratification of the CTBT, the US will do well not to be didactic towards India on the CTBT issue. Since, as a consequence of the Senate vote, China and Russia are also not likely to accept implementation of the treaty, the US should adopt a flexible approach to India on the issue. Similarly, the US should be sensitive to Indian economic concerns and socio-economic predicaments during the WTO Millennium discussions. Needed are conscious efforts by both sides to discard attitudes and mindsets which afflicted Indo-US relations for nearly 40 years after India8217;s independence.