Plan for the great thaw

The end of the Cold War between 1989 and 1991 has reduced the centrality of that question. As US diplomat and scholar Dennis Kux asserted in the mid-1990s, 8216;now that the Cold War is happily history, India has slid down the ladder of US priorities although its continuing effort to develop as a democracy does remain significant8217;. Significantly, Kux went on to conclude: 8216;one can hardly make support for democracy as a guiding principle of American foreign policy, yet ignore what happens in a democracy in a country where 860 million people live, one out of every six human beings on earth8217; Kux wrote this in 1994.

A draft defence planning document, leaked to the New York Times in 1992, outlined the USA8217;s South Asia policy thus: 8216;We US will seek to prevent the further development of nuclear arms race on the Indian sub-continent. In this regard we should work to have both countries, India and Pakistan, adhere to Non-Proliferation Treaty and to place their nuclear energy facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency8217;s safeguard. We should discourage Indian hegemonic aspirations over the other states in South Asia and on the Indian Ocean. With regard to Pakistan, a constructive US-Pakistan military relationship will be an important element in our strategy to promote stable security conditions in South West Asia and Central Asia8217;.

The history of Indo-US technological cooperation has been a chequered one. While on the one hand, it is the inputs from the US which initiated our space and nuclear programmes, cooperation in these spheres was always subject to US concerns about horizontal proliferation and military imbalance between India and Pakistan.

There was reluctance on the part of the US to assist India in developing its infrastructural industries, particularly in the steel sector which only changed after the Russians gave this assistance and the resulting competition brought in the British and the Germans.

The 1974 underground nuclear tests by India resulted in the re-imposition of technological and economic sanctions against India. An attempt was made to remedy matters in Reagan8217;s tenure when a memorandum of understanding was signed between the US and India in 1984, which included arrangements for cooperation in computer technology and aspects of space technology for peaceful purposes.

But these arrangements did not take off. Regimes like the Missile Technology Control Regime, the NSG Agreement by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of the US came into operation. Similarly doctrines of dual use technology created a generally restrictive atmosphere.

The 1998 nuclear weapons tests by India compounded this situation. The US imposed across-the-board economic and technological sanctions putting into operation its 8216;enhanced proliferation control initiative8217;. Two hundred Indian organisations or entities were put on the prohibited list.

It was only in September 2001 that the Bush administration removed all sanctions against India and Pakistan, although certain restrictions have remained in place under the US Non-Proliferation Act and related congressional stipulations.

Now 24 entities remain on the Restrictive List. These are India8217;s nuclear facilities which are not under IAEA safeguards, the Defence and Research Development Organisation, the Bharat Electronics, Indian Rare Earth Organisation. India8217;s importing sophisticated technologies now is not subject to the comprehensive negativism of the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative. US export licences are still necessary but the applications are predicated on positive response. The Bush administration not only continued but expanded the positive orientation towards India initiated by Bill Clinton in the last year of his tenure.

While the Bush administration remains committed to its global non-proliferation and arms control objective, there has been a certain adjustability in their approach on these issues rooted in the US8217;s strategic and security interest. There has been more political realism.

The political and strategic considerations affecting US policies towards India seem to be changing. The US president presents a National Security Assessment to the Congress; Bush made this presentation in September 2002. It is significant that he referred to India in this presentation under the chapter of emerging centres of global power, underlining the strengthening of relations with India as an important item on the US foreign policy agenda. Indo-US trade in technology, particularly the non-atomic energy sector, forms a major segment of Indo-US bilateral trade, growing at 35 to 40 per cent per annum.

The US seems to reluctantly acknowledge India8217;s nuclear weapons status and, more importantly, India8217;s capacities to function as a responsible nuclear weapons power even though it does not recognise India as a nuclear power legally. Further meetings of the high technology consultative group are scheduled for next year and it is reasonable to presume that cooperation in the technological sector would be a cementing factor in Indo-US relations.

This prospect is, of course, subject to the overall strategic stipulation that India8217;s policies do not radically contradict or challenge the global and regional order envisaged by the US policy planners. The extent to which India can conform to the American world view in the context of Indian interests constitutes a challenge for India8217;s foreign policy planners.