Now for a reality check

Pakistani arguments that Pakistan had nothing to do with this violence and the analysis in sections of the Indian government that it was engineered by Pakistan8217;s ISI and armed forces, over whom the Pakistani Prime Minister has no control, are equally spurious. That such tension is heightened during every meeting between the Prime Ministers especially since 1989 shows a certain orchestration between Pakistan8217;s political and military establishment to create an atmosphere focused on Kashmir during the talks.

On Atalji8217;s bus ride, there was much Indian spontaneity, public enthusiasm and mushiness. There were gushing comments about 8220;breakthroughs8221;, 8220;a new dawn8221; and Vajpayee being about to be showered with pyar anddular the moment he crossed the border. The subdued and measured welcome he received was a contrast. Even the body language when the Prime Ministers embraced was characterised by Vajpayee8217;s natural warmth and Nawaz Sharif8217;s slightly embarrassed and reticent response. While Vajpayee was precise in defining the possibilities when he said he was going with mixed feelings and expected to make a beginning without too many expectations, sections of the media went overboard.

Attitudes and policy orientations found accurate expression in the Lahore Declaration and the Memorandum of Understanding signed at Lahore. The main points in the Declaration were that both sides would take steps for strategic restraints on their nuclear and missile capacities to avoid accidental nuclear confrontation. Meaningful discussions would be held for additional confidence-building measures CBMs to ensure stability and mutual security. Significantly, there was no movement on a no-first-use or no-war agreement. Pakistan wasunwilling to extend the existing agreement on no-attack on each other8217;s nuclear installations to cover major population centres and centres of economic activity. Official statements from both sides affirmed their static negotiating stances on Kashmir even before the visit. The Lahore Declaration only mentions the two Prime Ministers8217; decision to intensify discussions on Kashmir. It is neither here nor there.

The agreement not to interfere in each other8217;s internal affairs is a commitment repeated ad infinitum since the Tashkent Declaration. India should, however, note the nuance. Pakistan does not consider Jammu and Kashmir a part of India. So in committing itself not to interfere in India8217;s internal affairs, it retains the option of intrusive activities in that state. There is no specific indication on updating and then implementing the tentative agreements which exist on Siachen, Sir Creek and Wular Barrage.

The Memorandum of Understanding between the two Foreign Secretaries elaborates the politicaldecisions in the Lahore Declaration. Most of it is a repetition of statements issued after meetings between Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto, Narasimha Rao and Nawaz Sharif, and I.K. Gujral and Nawaz Sharif. The new and possibly positive elements are: agreement to consult on security concepts and nuclear doctrines, put in place measures for CBMs in the nuclear and conventional fields, the decision to give advance notice of missile tests and sign an agreement on the subject, and taking steps to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons. Both sides have undertaken to abide by the moratorium on further tests, with the rider that they retain the option of testing if vital national security interests are involved. These are constructive agreements in the context of the nuclear weaponisation and missile capacities of India and Pakistan.

One has no knowledge of what transpired in the personal discussions between Vajpayee and Sharif. One hopes that given the practical and rational mindsetof both men, they have come to some agreement on compromises on the complex problems affecting Indo-Pakistan relations, especially Pakistan.

The visit was an important exercise in educating public opinion about the desirability of both countries reasoning together to bring normalcy to the region. The direct dialogue affirmed the capacity and, more importantly, the willingness of the two governments to engage to resolve long-standing problems. This was a message to the international community that while its goodwill is welcome, its direct mediation is not necessary. This is subject to our awareness that Pakistan is not averse to third-party mediation.

The Prime Ministerial exchange would give a political impetus to official discussions. Most importantly, the agreements on maintaining strategic restraint in nuclear and missile capacities and on being transparent about missile flights and tests are a confirmation that India and Pakistan are responsible countries conscious of the need to manage theimplications of their nuclear and missile weaponisation. However tentative or inadequate the results of the visit, they could contribute to normalisation and cooperation over a period. The substance will only crystallise in the subsequent rounds of official discussions. The euphoria about major breakthroughs was uncalled for. The specific results were as expected.

Speculating on the prospects of bilateral relations after the visit, to have hopes is both desirable and legitimate, but predicating such efforts on illusions rejecting realities would be counter-productive.