Note these Chinese whispers

Although the PLA8217;s backwardness was well known, a less acknowledged fact was that it was part of a deliberate strategy. When Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1979, the PLA was 4.5 million strong. China was also maintaining a huge military industrial complex. Yet, China failed to defeat Vietnam in 1979. But what bothered Deng more was China8217;s economic backwardness. He therefore opted for a grand strategy wherein military modernisation was given lower priority than economic reform. Throughout the 8217;80s and mid-8217;90s the PLA was forced to operate within an environment of resource constraint. The PLA trimmed its manpower, allowed conversion of defence technologies for civilian use, and set up many business enterprises. Modernisation of the PLA during this phase was only incremental, that too only in the early 8217;90s. To compensate for the PLA8217;s backwardness, China resorted to what can be called 8220;diplomatic defence8221;. It sought to create a peaceful international and regional environment and improved relations with neighbours by resolving less contentious issues and suggesting the 8220;postponement of complex issues8221;.

Sustained economic development at a high rate allowed enough financial resources for PLA8217;s modernisation in the late 8217;90s. In 1995, the official figure for defence expenditure was RMB 63 billion; that increased to RMB 206 billion around 25 billion. Thus, based on 1995 figures, the budget has increased more than three times. However, western sources say the unofficial defence expenditure is at least three times higher. Whatever be the truth, China has become generous towards the PLA. However, the focus is still embedded around economic development. Military modernisation is still secondary to economic modernisation.

As the 2004 white paper reveals, the PLA is working towards a new doctrine of 8220;winning local wars under informationalised conditions8221;. Probably inspired by the US8217; successes in various local wars in the last decade and half, China has realised that it is a laggard as far as the revolution in military affairs RMA is concerned. To bridge the gap, the Chinese PLA has plans to comprehensively push forward informationalisation with military information systems and informationalised main battle weapon systems as the mainstay in any future war. Towards this end, the PLA is also implementing the 8220;strategic project for talented people8221;. The project proposes that in one to two decades the PLA will possess a contingent of command officers capable of directing informationalised wars and building informationalised armed forces. The PLA has also decided to reduce 200,000 troops by end 2005. The goal is clear: optimal force structures, smoother internal relations and better quality.

The PLA Secondary Artillery Force has emerged as a major strategic force for protecting China8217;s security. To quote from the white paper, 8220;by upgrading missiles, stepping up the R038;D of missiles and promoting the informationalisation of missiles and supporting equipment for command, communications and reconnaissance, the Second Artillery Force has built in its initial form a weaponry and equipment system that comprises both nuclear and conventional missiles, covers different ranges, and possesses markedly increased power and efficiency8221;.

The PLA Air Force is also transitioning from a defensive force to one with a modern, offensive strike capability. The modernisation effort is aimed mainly at defeating regional forces, defeating aircraft operating at long ranges from China8217;s coast, denying US naval operations and striking regional targets such as airbases and air defence sites. The PLA Navy is also shifting from coastal defence towards open-ocean operations although China is still weak in this area.

China has been able to strike a balance between development and defence. Even now, the official defence expenditure is just 1.63 per cent of the GDP, lower than all great powers except Japan. As long as its developmental goals are not achieved, China would keep assigning a lower proportion of its GDP to the PLA. Simultaneously, it will continue to use diplomacy as a foreign policy and conflict resolution tool. Probably, there is a lesson to be learnt from the Chinese experience.

The writer is in the Indian Defence Accounts Service. Views expressed are his own