Musharraf, so what?

There would be a continuity in US perceptions and policies on Indo-Pakistan relations regardless of who captures the presidency. The main ingredients of the US policies on Indo-Pakistan relations are: Conflict-prone, tense relations between India and Pakistan will impact negatively on stability and peace in South Asia which compounds the tensions which the USA faces in the Middle East and Afghanistan. Such instability will also affect the security of the Gulf region, where the US has vital interests. Indo-Pakistan confrontation also spans religious extremism, terrorism and narco-crimes. The nuclear weaponisation of India and Pakistan is a dangerous element given the explosive historical and emotional impulses affecting Jamp;K and Indo-Pakistan relations. The US, therefore, considers the restoration of negotiations between India and Pakistan as an objective of its South Asia policies. The US has come round the view that any change of the territorial arrangements in Jamp;K rooted in the Line of Control would lead toheightened tensions and military confrontation. So the US supports the Indian stance on the sensitivity of the LOC. This, however, should not be interpreted as US supporting India8217;s stance on the basic and overall issues affecting Jamp;K. The US considers Kashmir a dispute between India and Pakistan which has to be resolved bilaterally. It is also of the view that any solution of the problem has to take into account the interests of the people of Jamp;K who live on both sides of the LOC. There will be continuity in this policy approach.

Discussions on political compromises based on the grant of more autonomy to Jamp;K have become active and substantial. The two most important dissenting political groups, the Hurriyat Conference and the Hizbul Mujahideen, seem to be coming round to the view that they should engage in negotiations with the Government of India. The Hurriyat leadership and a major segment of the Hizbul Mujahideen seemed to be willing to talk to the government in what they call the first phase of negotiations without insisting on the presence of Pakistan. This modification of their view about the conditionality of Pakistani presence seems to be the result of three factors.

Political realism, the people of Jamp;K being weary of the prolonged violence and perceptions about international attitudes and pressures necessitate a dialogue. One should at the same time realise that Pakistan will remain obdurate about any separate discussions being undertaken between Kashmiri opposition groups and the Indian government. But Pakistan may find it difficult to stick to this negative attitude if the major Kashmir groups take the stance of agreeing to a dialogue without Pakistani presence in the initial stages. There are reports of Pakistan being advised by the US not to stand in the way of the initiation of the discussions.

The Musharraf government has adopted a clever public stance that it is willing to resume dialogue with India at any time, at any place, with Kashmir being the core issue on the agenda, without any pre-conditions. The US continues to have the capacity to exert some influence on Pakistan to move towards normalisation of relations with India.

While there is a stand-off between the governments of India and Pakistan, non-governmental contacts between the two countries have been going on. Delegations consisting of women8217;s organisations and NGOs dealing with human rights have been exchanged with consistent frequency.

These delegations included journalists, former diplomats and former military commanders. Their objective has been to see if the aberrations caused by Kargil can be removed and some sort of a dialogue resumed. The general conclusion that one draws from these developments is that there is a groundswell of opinion in both countries and Jamp;K to resume negotiations.

There is, therefore, a need for India to re-examine the policy stance that it has adopted of not agreeing to a dialogue with Pakistan till there is complete cessation of terrorist intervention in Jamp;K. The Indian stance is logical and valid at the normative levels. But then there is need for flexibility which would be responsive to emerging political realities. That there is an inclination towards such a flexibility is reflected in the government8217;s willingness to talk to the dissident groups of Jamp;K without any political pre-conditions. No political compromise negotiated with the dissident groups of Jamp;K can be durable without a separate discussion between India and Pakistan, leading to an endorsement of these possible compromises. There is a need to discuss confidence-building measures to ensure strategic restraint between India and Pakistan in terms of their nuclear weapons. This need was acknowledged during the Lahore meeting between Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif. The policy not to resume dialogue with Pakistanwill only strengthen the military dictatorship as it would argue for its continuance in power to meet the threat from India inherent in its rejection of a dialogue.

Important world powers backed by the international community will move back from the generally supportive attitude that it has taken in favour of India8217;s rational and mature reaction to the Kargil conflict. Beyond a certain point of time, India8217;s refusal to resume a dialogue will lead to perceptions about India being obstinate and unreasonable. Our argument that we shall not deal with a military dictatorship, particularly a military leader who engineered the Kargil conflict, may find acceptance only for a limited period. The requirement of realpolitik is to deal with whatever government is in effective power in Pakistan. It is time both countries transcended their insular xenophobic antagonism to get back to the negotiating table.

Beyond a certain point of time, India8217;s refusal to resume a dialogue will lead to perceptions about India being obstinate and unreasonable.