Massacre in Moscow

Even by Moscow8217;s standards, the events of the last week in Russia have been extreme, culminating in the return as prime minister of Viktor Chernomyrdin, ousted only three months ago. The problem, it seems, is now to be peddled as the cure. Chernomyrdin must take much of the blame for Russia8217;s plight. He was no enthusiastic reformer in his five-year term as prime minister. His return now is clearly the act of a 8220;desperate8221; president Yeltsin, losing his grip, more concerned with his own survival than Russia8217;s. The deal seems transparent enough, though in the wrong sense of the term. Yeltsin buys time for himself in his office, probably until the end of the century, and Chernomyrdin wins Yeltsin8217;s support for his own candidacy for the presidency after that. It is not incidental that Chernomyrdin has ties to the whole of the Russian political establishment.

But what has any of this to do with saving the Russian economy? Profoundly sad, but nothing at all. If reform was the criterion, Sergei Kiriyenko, the 30-something non-entity who established his reformist credentials in little time, would still be here. Chernomyrdin, on the other hand, is unlikely to risk any radical reform, presidential ambition and the deep unpopularity of reformist economic policies being his prime considerations. Such reform as occurs will probably be squeezed out by the IMF and the frank collapse towards which the economy seems headed. For Russia, it is the proverbial vicious circle. When the Soviet Union collapsed, it had to take the 8220;big-bang8221; route to economic reform to keep western assistance flowing. That turned out to be far feebler than Russia had hoped for. Indeed it made sense as western policy, but did little to shore up a desperate country. With each bout of western-urged reform, Russians8217; suffering grew worse. It is easy to argue that if it had been carried out in theright conditions, big-bang reform would have begun to pay off by now. Indeed, Russia saw a year of growth at last, with stable currency and controlled inflation till the currency turmoil caught up with it, forcing an effective devaluation of the rouble by 50 per cent and debt default.

For all that it seems clear with hindsight that big-bang was the wrong idea, whatever the West may say, for an economy to which openness and competition were so utterly alien. Reform is rarely carried out in ideal conditions. In Russia they were particularly inconducive. But all this is now of no more than academic interest. Russia has muddled its way too far down the road to market economics to do anything but persist without making the misery of Russian people even worse. Much of Russia8217;s political establishment and most of its people would like to turn their back on reform, but the answer to what would supplant it is far less forthcoming. What Russia needs just now is a leader who would ruthlessly push forth and work to get around the vested interests that hold Russia in their grip so that there is at least light at the end of the tunnel. This is why the reappointment of Chernomyrdin saddles Russia with not one but two unsuitable men at the top. Yeltsin, great leader as he was, has outlived his utility forRussia. He is now the problem, not the solution.