Kargil revisited

Compared to the ten-week shooting war between the two countries, the hype on nuclear weapons now has been phenomenal indeed. Pakistan started to raise the nuclear bogey as soon as the summer began and it was clear that its January promises had not been translated into action. General Musharraf kicked off his referendum campaign in April with nuclear threats. With the increased threat of Indian military action after the massacre in Kaluchak on May 14, Pakistan started a vehement campaign to imply that nuclear weapons would be used. The rhetoric was backed up by firing off three ballistic missiles. The international community, unlike its ennui three years ago, suddenly discovered the dangers of a nuclear confrontation. Pakistan succeeded in blackmailing the US and its allies. But it failed to impress New Delhi, or change its policy.

The second key difference between then and now is that, unlike the Kargil War when we had remained strategically on the defensive, it is India now that has threatened to initiate military operations. While this has made many people uncomfortable, it is difficult to believe that this was the reason for the nuclear hype this time. India would only be responding to a war through terror unleashed by a militarised jehadi force by Pakistan for over a decade. It is also curious that some knowledgeable Indians have accepted that any shooting war, even a 8216;limited8217; one, now will escalate to a nuclear exchange; but the one launched by Pakistan in 1999 did not excite such concerns. Do we then draw the conclusion that Pakistan could initiate military operations across accepted borders under the nuclear umbrella, but India cannot do so? How can the risks in the latter case be higher than those in the former?

Accepting such a rationale would amount to acquiescing with the logic of aggression by an irredentist state providing more pay-offs than that of restrained self-defence. Even more important, conceding this logic amounts to reinforcing Islamabad8217;s belief that nuclear weapons deter India from any and every option to employ military force to change Pakistan8217;s policies. This does not, however, mean that there are no risks of unintended escalation or miscalculation. But then this is the challenge for strategy: to ensure that we succeed under the given environment. This requires accepting that the nature of our wars has altered after 1987 when Pakistan became a nuclear weapon state. And since this will be the reality for the coming decades, it also demands that we objectively examine our military options and force structures, so as to be able to apply punitive action with conventional military power while retaining control over escalation.

Thirdly, during the Kargil War, the US was engaged with both countries directly from mid-June onwards. But the process had essentially remained discreet. This time, while real diplomacy is undoubtedly being conducted quietly, there is a public dimension to it from the very beginning that can be a complicating factor. So far it has worked to our advantage. For example, even though Islamabad managed unlike in 1999 to blackmail Washington with the threat of nuclear weapons, it rebounded on it forcing General Musharraf to come up with stronger commitments to stop infiltration and terrorism including closing down the jehadi infrastructure within Pakistan. The longer-term gain for New Delhi is that the nuclear wolf cannot be called upon again and again without a price.

Fourth, Pakistani assumptions for launching its wars of aggression have remained unchanged even now. But the key issue is that it failed in every war that it launched against India in the past. Every such failure inevitably resulted in serious political turmoil and instability in Pakistan. The progressive but inevitable failure of its jehadi war through terror is also likely to lead to political instability and possible upheaval already made worse by the prevailing economic and social crises. The direction of likely after-shocks may not be clear at this stage. But we would do well to reflect on possible scenarios and start thinking of our own policy choices beyond celebrations. We also need to remember that every defeat has led to the aggravation of Pakistani bitterness and a deepening desire for revenge against India. Our success in the war against terrorism would amount to a dual defeat for Pakistan, coinciding with that on its western side. The power differential has been tilting further in India8217;s favour in any case for many years now. It would require great courage and sagacity on the part of the Pakistani elites to accept and reconcile with the realities rather than renew the revenge war through any new means.