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This is an archive article published on September 21, 2007

Judges and citizens

If an ex-judge is aggrieved by a report, he can sue for libel. Why bring in the notion of contempt?

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It is impossible to agree with the Delhi High Court8217;s decision that journalists who question some aspects of the career of a former judge are automatically guilty of contempt. There have been many learned debates about the notion of contempt. Truth as a defence has been postulated and found not inconsiderable acceptance in legal/judicial circles. There have been informed discussion over the merits and demerits of critiquing judicial pronouncements in ongoing cases. But, and this is the saddest thing, none of these weighty arguments is needed to oppose the penalty imposed on Mid Day journalists. Even under old-fashioned, rigid definitions of contempt of court, the Delhi HC8217;s decision doesn8217;t seem to meet the test of logic. The reportage was about the professional record of a judge who8217;s now retired, who8217;s no longer a part of judiciary, who8217;s now a citizen with no formal judicial affiliations. How does one seamlessly move from retired judges to the judiciary while judging issues of contempt? One can8217;t.

If the logic is that the reportage raised issues about the ex-judge8217;s decisions when he was in active service and therefore it besmirched the judiciary in general, the counter is simple: The ex-judge can exercise the same option available to every citizen, sue for libel.

Indeed, that would have been the simplest, cleanest and most reasonable response to the stories. Instead what we have now is a Delhi HC-backed idea that the judiciary8217;s institutional scope is so extendable that lifetime protection from scrutiny is available to anyone who has been a judge once.

It is crucial, for reasons too well known to repeat, for the judiciary to attract a high degree of public trust. One part of that trust is built by courts correcting executive and legislative excesses, and there is a splendid record of that in recent times. But the other part of the trust depends on the judiciary not being seen as over-keen to totally insulate itself from rest of the system, especially when it comes to questions of professional propriety. There have been debates before on the degree of self-policing and self-correction that is optimum for the judiciary and the system. This is an unresolved debate. But one that was progressing well. The discourse has regressed considerably following the Delhi HC8217;s judgment.

 

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