
Despite the tall talk about their relationship acquiring 8220;a global and strategic character8221;, India and China have had no choice but to focus on clearing the debris from their turbulent past. Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Wen Jiabao deserve applause for coming up with a set of guiding principles to resolve their boundary dispute, which has dogged the two nations ever since their date with modern territorial statehood. A pretense of friendship in the mid-8217;50s, a war in 8217;62, and a cautious engagement since the late 8217;80s did not produce any forward movement on the boundary dispute. This history makes Monday8217;s agreement on the 8220;guiding principles and political parameters8221; for the resolution of the boundary dispute a big breakthrough.
Building on the earlier initiatives of Rajiv Gandhi and A.B. Vajpayee, the Manmohan Singh government has now codified the elements of a boundary deal with China. Article III underlines the importance of 8220;meaningful and mutually acceptable adjustments to their respective positions8221;. Translation: both sides have to make territorial concessions. The nature of this give and take is identified in Articles IV and VII. Article IV endorses Chinese claim on Aksai Chin in the Western sector by stating that 8220;due consideration8221; should be given to each other8217;s 8220;strategic and reasonable interests8221;. Aksai Chin is strategic piece of real estate that links two of China8217;s sensitive border provinces, Tibet and Xinjiang. Article VII protects India8217;s claims in Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector, by safeguarding the 8220;due interests of their settled populations in the border areas8221;. Senior officials will translate this broad swap of claims on Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh into specifics Article X. Experts will delineate and demarcate the linear boundary by using geographic principles, modern cartography and joint surveys Article VI and VIII.
The long overdue advance on the boundary dispute and progress in bilateral cooperation are impressive. But few will lose sleep over the proclaimed decision by India and China to establish a strategic partnership. Both want good ties with the sole superpower, the US. India and China have scrupulously avoided mentioning 8220;multipolarity8221; in their joint statement. The idea of a strategic partnership looks even less credible when we look at the bilateral differences that have been swept under the carpet. These relate to China8217;s nuclear, missile and military assistance to Pakistan and Beijing8217;s growing political profile in India8217;s neighbourhood. As they circle each other in the region, India and China are unlikely to find ways to jointly balance the US.