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This is an archive article published on February 20, 2006

Help, before fear takes wing

Loss to life from a disease is typically computed on the basis of mortality rates. By that reckoning avian influenza, with rates up to 90-10...

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Loss to life from a disease is typically computed on the basis of mortality rates. By that reckoning avian influenza, with rates up to 90-100 per cent, would be as deadly as it gets, right? Not quite. For poultry farmers across the world, appearance of the H5N1 strain of bird flu signals damages far in excess of these estimates.

Take the first intimations after laboratory results confirmed the presence of the virus in samples of dead birds from Nandurbar district in northern Maharashtra. Over the past week 40,000 chickens in the area are believed to have died. In the first hours after the confirmed debut of avian influenza in the country, contingency plans to kill 8 lakh additional birds within 3 km of the affected poultry farms were immediately set into operation.

Ever since this virulent strain of bird flu appeared in Hong Kong in 1997, more than 150 million birds have been culled. The week gone by could rapidly kick up that count, as the H5N1 virus turned up in 16 countries across Asia, Africa and Europe.

Preventing the spread of the virus 8212; from one region to another, and significantly from one country to another 8212; demands prompt disclosure about possible outbreaks. And the accompanying fear of human manifestations of avian flu also recommends surveillance of persons who could have been in sustained contact with the diseased birds.

These, remember, are birds that may not really have been sick. But they must be culled. Because among domesticated birds, the virus is so contagious that the American Centers for Disease Control and Prevention fears that the disease can realise a mortality rate of 90-100 per cent within 48 hours. And these, alas, are human beings who may not have been touched by the virus. But they must be sequestered out of their busy lives for observation. Because the persons carrying the virus of could pass it on 8212; and here about this virus whose transformations are so little known, administrators must deal with possibilities, not actual experience 8212; before they themselves show symptoms of the influenza.

Beyond the race to stockpile anti-viral drugs like Tamiflu and hurry research on vaccines, avian flu is already confronting us with questions of liberty and incentives.

H5N1 is fast attaining all the attributes of a pathogen that can set off a pandemic 8212; by some speculation, even a pandemic of the order of the 1918 bout. Then, the mortality rate of less than 3 per cent, but given its wide spread, anywhere between 20 and 50 million died. Extrapolating from those numbers has, in fact, become a regular8212;and immensely alarmist8212;part of stocktaking to assess preparedness to tackle a possibly imminent pandemic.

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But for questions of quarantines and transparency, one need return to the outbreak of SARS severe acute respiratory syndrome three years ago. Then, Chinese authorities came in for stringent criticism for suppressing the news of a deadly and highly contagious pneumonia that first appeared in Guangdong district. It was the quick spread of the virus, first to Hong Kong and to Laos and Canada, that highlighted the dangers of not isolating a new, unknown illness fast enough. In the end, SARS was conquered. The WHO8217;s final tally put the total number of infections at 8,437 and deaths at 813. Even so, the curtailed travel of those three-four months in parts of Southeast Asia put the losses at 60 billion.

But the episode did bring China further criticism as it went about closing down its wildlife markets. The World Health Organisation argued that the compulsory quarantines then enforced in China were 8220;victimising8221; people.

How punishing could quarantines be in this brush with bird flu? The CDC reports that in cases of human infection, avian influenza has still not known to be transmitted beyond one person. But it notes a nagging fear: 8220;The virus 8212; if given enough opportunities 8212; will change into a form that is highly infectious for humans and spread easily from person to person.8221; That is: in seeking to starve the virus of carriers the aim is not simply to limit the incidence of the illness. It is, even more importantly, aimed at depriving the virus of chances of changing enough to leap beyond that current one-person barrier.

In that case, all the gloomy projections would swing into reality. So normal hesitations against quarantines can be quelled. The alternative is much too dire. In case of H5N1 virus, which recognises no immigration checks and can be borne by migratory birds, failure to take adequate precautions in one part of the world can wreak damage all around.

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So just as local governments are heeding that logic to compensate farmers whose poultry is being sacrificed in preventive measures, a global graciousness would be in order. Regions, countries and industries affected must be compensated and assisted. It would be ethical. And it8217;d be smart.

 

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