Hamas, a political party?

But is the Hamas ready to be a player? Through its prolonged militancy, Hamas has considerably weakened the Palestinian institutions, especially the PNA. Yet, despite all its effects lasting over a decade, the militant group was unable to dislodge, delegitimise or overthrow the PNA. The willingness of the Palestinian population to endorse its militant campaign against Israel was not accompanied by a similar approval for its anti-PNA tactics. Indeed, Hamas is yet to establish its unqualified willingness to recognise the supremacy of the Palestinian Authority. To be a player, Hamas needs a fundamental transformation and learn to play the role of an opposition rather than opponent of the Authority.

Even if Abbas were to be willing, there are no clear indications that accommodation could be possible. The prolonged failure of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat was a clear indication that Hamas could be neither cowed down nor accommodated. Moderate Palestinian leaders have expressed reservations about the wisdom of seeking accommodation with the militants and have argued that such a course might even be counterproductive.

It would be naive to compare Hamas to the erstwhile Fatah and suggest that the militants were capable of making a transition towards seeking a political, not maximalist, solution vis-a-vis Israel. While radical ideology shaped the formative years of Fatah, the militants are driven by an uncompromising religious extremism. If it were to be a player in the peace process, Hamas would have to come to terms with objective realities.

Its participation in the election does not mean mere recognition of the Oslo process and its aftermath. For Hamas it would also mean coming to terms with Israel and to the partition of the land it considers Islamic, sacrosanct and hence inseparable. It would also imply its preparedness to accept the democratic transformation of the Palestinian people and working towards statehood. While a non-compromising opposition to the Israelis might strengthen its position as a militant group, its participation in parliamentary politics would require a willingness to adopt pragmatic positions. Without moderation and the willingness to compromise, enlisting Hamas in the electoral process would only complicate matters for Abbas.

To be a meaningful political player, Hamas would have to transform itself from being a militant organisation into a political party. Would it, then, be able to sustain its intransigence vis-a-vis Israel’s existence? Can Hamas deliver a better deal for the Palestinians than the Fatah-led PLO? Its popularity alone would be insufficient for Hamas to be the principal spokesperson for the Palestinians. If it is to compete with and perhaps replace the PLO, it needs to present itself as a political party guided by compromise rather than a militant group driven by ideological militancy.

There is one additional problem. In recent years, as part of its counter-terrorism policy, Israel has assassinated a number of leaders of Hamas. While militants can be recruited and replaced, finding political leaders who enjoy widespread support will not be easy. Thus, given the leadership crisis within the organisation, it is far from certain whether Hamas has the ability to make that transformation.

Moreover, even when its spiritual leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, was alive, Hamas had to confront the ‘‘outside’’ leaders who tended to take the more extremist positions than those in the occupied territories. With the absence of charismatic political leadership, any suggestions by the local leaders for ‘‘accommodation’’ with Israel would be rejected by the outsider. Such a course could plunge the organisation into internal chaos.

While pursuing Palestinian statehood, Hamas would have to exhibit moderation and accommodation. Without this, it will continue to be a spoiler of the peace process rather than a player in peace-making efforts.

The writer teaches Israeli politics at JNU, New Delhi