General principles

For the first time since General Pervez Musharraf ousted Nawaz Sharif in a coup in October 1999, the nature of the relationship between the internal dynamics of Pakistan and the future of the peace process is back in question. As the foreign secretaries of the two countries kicked off the fourth round of the composite dialogue this week in Islamabad, worldwide attention was focused more on Musharraf8217;s sacking of Pakistan8217;s chief justice than on the minutiae of the Indo-Pak peace process. On their own, the internal protests against the military regime would not have been consequential. They come, however, amidst a palpable sense that Musharraf might be losing ground where it matters most 8212; in Washington. After the unstinted support to Musharraf since September 2001, the Bush administration appears increasingly sceptical about the general8217;s willingness, to say nothing of capability, to deliver on the war against the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban along and across the Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan. There are thinly veiled hints in the American media that the Bush administration has indeed begun to contemplate a post-Musharraf future for Pakistan.

As India considers the prospects of the peace process amidst the growing political fragility of the Musharraf regime, it is worth recalling Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee8217;s response to the October 1999 coup. Despite the strong grounds for a political grudge against Musharraf and the general8217;s inability to acquire immediate international legitimacy, Vajpayee had quickly concluded that India must engage Pakistan without a reference to its internal politics. That simple principle holds good in the current political turbulence that has engulfed Pakistan. There is nothing to suggest that Musharraf8217;s ouster will result in a structural change in Pakistani politics. The tactical question before India is straightforward. Would a weaker Musharraf turn his back on the peace process or intensify it?

After his recent talks with the Pakistani leadership, Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon should have some kind of an answer. If New Delhi is convinced that Musharraf is ready to quicken the pace of normalising bilateral relations and countenance a reasonable solution to the Kashmir question, it should embrace him, even if that might look like throwing a political lifeline to a besieged general.