Friends like these

That Indonesia, Egypt and Iran have opposed India8217;s initiative to renew civilian nuclear cooperation will not surprise anyone familiar either with the history of the non-aligned movement or the pathology of third world nuclear politics. The trenchant opposition from the leading lights of the NAM, however, exposes the ideological mumbo-jumbo that 8220;progressives8221; have been championing in the name of an independent foreign policy. In objecting to the nuclear deal, the non-aligned bloc is highlighting its central significance 8212; an international acceptance of India8217;s nuclear exceptionalism. It is easy to understand the NAM complaints on the special nuclear treatment being offered to India. It is difficult to explain why NAM romanticisers in India didn8217;t see this was inevitable, that the deal would be opposed precisely because it took India out of this group of usual suspects.

The progressives, whose ideas of third world solidarity have never been handicapped by recognition of global realpolitik realities, must nonetheless recognise that New Delhi8217;s 8220;independent8221; atomic policy never had much in common with the NAM8217;s nuclear positions. Unlike most of the NAM, India never signed the non-proliferation treaty NPT. While major developing countries have long sought the 8220;universalisation8221; of the NPT and demanded that India roll back its nuclear weapon programme, New Delhi has consistently defended its right to acquire nuclear weapons and drawn notice to its strong commitment to preventing proliferation to other developing countries.

India8217;s nuclear policy was never about the NAM, it was always about power aspirations.

The divergence between India and the NAM on security issues runs deeper. Neither in the 1962 war with China nor in the many conflicts with Pakistan in 1965, 1971, and 1999 did the NAM find the political courage to back India. The NAM was never really consequential for India8217;s national security. The noisy national discourse on NAM has always reflected the domestic divisions on foreign policy. The Left derided non-alignment as immoral in the 8217;50s, because Nehru refused to take sides in the Cold War. The right wing parties accused the Congress of tilting towards Russia and demanded 8220;genuine non-alignment8221;. Of course, India8217;s current foreign policy crisis has little to do with the political opportunism of the CPM and the BJP. It is rooted in the limited array of the Congress8217;s political choices. Wherever the deal goes, let8217;s hope India is suitably cold at the next NAM jamboree.