Fixing the Afghan wobble

NATO8217;s presence in south and east Afghanistan will improve the unstable situation

On August 1, there was an important security development in Afghanistan. By inducting an additional 8,000 troops in six southern provinces of Afghanistan, the NATO extended its security operations in what is considered to be the most challenging mission in its 57-year-old history. Achieving stability in war-ravaged Afghanistan has been a major effort ever since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001. Although the US-led coalition forces about 19,000 troops and NATO8217;s 10,000 strong International Security Assistance Force ISAF have succeeded in achieving some stability in the north and west, the security environment is deteriorating in the south and east.

Over 1,000 civilians have been killed in the insurgency this year 8212; nearly half this in May, when Kabul witnessed the worst rioting in its recent history. Most of the violence occurred in the southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan, the region from where the Taliban rose to take control of nearly 80 per cent of the country. That area continues to see the worst of the insurgency. On July 20 the British commander of the ISAF, Lt Gen David Richards, talking at the Royal United Services Institute, London, described the situation in Afghanistan as 8220;close to anarchy8221;.

A major problem NATO faces in Afghanistan is of 8220;interoperability8217;8217; and the fast turnover of troops. Currently, 36 European countries are contributing troops. Despite NATO8217;s reputation for standardisation of equipment and training, which enables diverse forces to work together, the ISAF has 8220;interoperability8217;8217; problems which affect its efficiency. Since the turnover of troops is frequent, operational voids are a problem; the Afghan initiative to disarm illegal groups by end-2007 is behind schedule.

Most armed groups take shelter under the politically vague criterion of 8220;illegal8217;8217;. Many of them perform local security functions. The problem here is that the Afghan government and the ISAF have neither the capacity to disarm all these groups nor the ability to fill a security void that such large-scale disarmament would create. A possible answer could be to absorb benign militias into the provincial police, and to deal pro-actively with those indulging in narcotics smuggling and other criminal offences.

Poppy production and drugs make up more than half of Afghanistan8217;s US7 billion economy. Opium is the only commodity in which Afghanistan is globally competitive. The counter-narcotics strategy hasn8217;t had much success, because the sector drives the country8217;s political economy. Without alternatives to guns and drugs, the warlords can destabilise the Karzai government. The counter-narcotics donor nations, who spend more than US3 billion annually, need to rework incentives for the opium-lords and government.

There are 23 provincial reconstruction teams PRTs in Afghanistan which integrate security and reconstruction efforts away from Kabul. These garrison style PRTs are an important link between security and development. More than half of them are deployed under the US command. Due to vast differences in national directives, action plans, and resources, no two PRTs function alike. While some have succeeded in sowing the seeds of development and bringing about a modicum of stability, others are mere frontier outposts, manned by soldiers who have little idea of reconstruction missions.

NATO8217;s presence in south and east Afghanistan would be able to improve the situation somewhat. Slow progress in governance and development has created a wide gap between expectations and ground realities in the public mind. Until the Afghans see a meaningful improvement in their lives, the country will remain unstable.

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Lastly, there are no indications of an exit strategy by the US/NATO forces. External military forces can reduce armed violence, create space for non-violent political competition and can act as a catalyst for development. But ultimately they will have to leave and, therefore, must have a clear exit strategy. The assumption is that once the coalition forces and NATO achieve adequate security for the local government and NGOs to work safely the military will withdraw. On the ground, however, there is little policy co-ordination between international agencies, NGOs and the military. Afghanistan is famous for being a fatal whirlpool for external adversaries as well as for friendly partners. It is hoped the international community has not forgotten this lesson of history.

The writer, a former chief of army staff, is president, ORF Institute of Security Studies, New Delhi