
Jyoti Basu characterised the decision of his party8217;s central committee not to allow him to become prime minister as a quot;historic blunderquot;. He has in the past few weeks gone a step further and called for the review of what he terms the half-century of hostile Congress-communist relations.
Even before the emergence of the CPI as an organised party there have been two lines contending within the communist movement in India on its relationship with the Congress. In 1920 at the second Congress of the Communist International this was the central issue of the differences between Lenin and M.N. Roy. Lenin advocated the strategy of the communists retaining their independent identity, cooperating with the Congress while also combating it. Roy advocated the strategy of the communists destroying the mass influence of the Congress and emerging as the principal anti-imperialist force.
From 1936 to 1947, despite the aberration of opposing the Quit India struggle, and from 1959 to 1977, the majority in the CPI did supportthe cooperate-combat-cooperate approach towards the Congress. The panicky retreat of the CPI in 1978 from this approach to anti-Congressism because of its electoral setback in 1977 illustrates the lack of ideological and theoretical depth to the support to this approach in the communist movement. Anti-Congressism seems to be the natural habitat of the communists in India, except for a minority who chose Lenin in preference to Roy. It remains the main hurdle to any collaboration between the CPIM-CPI and the Congress at the level of central government. It is worth noting that the Congress, in all its long history, has never acted on the basis of anti-communism except on two occasions.
When the CPI members of the AICC were suspended from the Congress in 1945 the suspension applied only to those communists who were AICC members and not to the CPI as such. The suspension, moreover, was only temporary. It was the majority in the CPI politbureau at the time who overruled P.C. Joshi, then general secretary of theCPI, and walked out of the Congress.
The two occasions on which the Congress acted against the CPI because it was the CPI were in the post-freedom period. The first was just after the 1952 general election. The united front of which the CPI was the strongest component won a majority in the legislative assembly of the then Madras Presidency. Pandit Nehru sent C. Rajagopalachari to Madras to break up the united front and prevent it from forming the ministry. He succeeded.
The second occasion was the Congress leadership of the so-called quot;liberation strugglequot; in Kerala in 1959 against the CPI-led united front ministry. That ministry was also unconstitutionally removed from office. Panditji was then Prime Minister and Indira Gandhi Congress president.
These occasions apart the Congress has never been anti-communist as such. It was with the CPI in the Kerala ministry from 1969 to 1978 when the CPI broke away. Congress ideology has never been anti-communist and at the central level the Congress has never hadto contend with the communists as its principal opponent.
It is useful to have this background of the ups and downs in the relations between the Congress and the communists in mind when assessing what these relations could now be.
If the BJP is to be removed from and kept out of power in Delhi it is not enough to rally all the anti-BJP or non-BJP parties and forces. This may only land the country from the frying pan into the fire. At best it would be even more ineffective and unstable than the United Front of 1996-98. The behaviour of the AIADMK and the near repetition in Delhi of Lucknow by the Samajwadi Party and the Rashtriya Janata Dal only underline this truth.
To take the country forward on secular, democratic lines it is indispensable for the Congress to revive itself in the country as a whole and to reestablish its presence in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. This is a tall order but not impossible. In both these states the CPIM-CPI can help it far more than their present number of MPs and MLAs wouldindicate. If the Congress and these parties unite both would be able to establish a much more positive understanding with the SP-RJD front than the total tailism which some advocate at present in the name of anti-BJP unity.
In many other states 8212; Orissa, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Punjab and Assam 8212; the CPIM-CPI and the Congress would be able to establish mutually beneficial relations, including in the electoral sphere. This would not come in the way of building broader alliances of secular and democratic parties.
There are three obstacles to collaborative relations between the Congress and CPIM-CPI. The first is anti-Congressism. The second is the electoral configuration in West Bengal, Kerala and Tripura. These are the bastions of the CPIM. The CPI is dependent on it while the Congress is the main opponent. The Trinamool Congress somewhat upsets the equation in West Bengal though one is not sure for how long. Though difficult the problem can be solved in the framework ofa national understanding. The CPIM can agree to support a Congress government at the Centre on the basis that the BJP retaining or recapturing power at the Centre would mean fascism taking over. With agreement on this basic issue there could be what have been called friendly contests in the three states mentioned above. This has been done in the past by the Congress and the CPI, though not on a state-wide basis.
The third obstacle is economic policy. This, in fact, is the easiest to surmount. The CPIM8217;s practice in West Bengal and Kerala provides a basis for agreement. So does the United Front8217;s minimum programme. Only minor adjustments would be needed to the loudness of the CPIM8217;s rhetoric.
In this situation Jyoti Basu8217;s importance looms large. If anybody has the just reputation of doing what is needed and doing it successfully no matter what the dogma, it is he. All he has to do is to live up to that reputation.
The writer is general secretary of UCPI