Democracy on hold

That Pakistan8217;s chief executive, General Pervez Musharraf, is a smooth, quiet executioner of plans was evident on October 12 when he presided over Nawaz Sharif8217;s dismissal from a PIA aircraft. That the people of Pakistan have been in acquiescence with the manoeuvre is equally evident from the perceptible absence of any show of dissent over his takeover. That the world beyond is moderating its response to developments in Islamabad is evident from the ifs and buts that punctuate condemnations of this interruption of the democratic process. How much of this will change with Musharraf8217;s affirmation that it could take two or three years before democracy is restored in Pakistan?

The general8217;s honeymoon is clearly a result of the Pakistanis8217; exasperation over the plundering and bungling their democratically elected leaders have indulged in. But while Musharraf8217;s assertion that he needs time to ensure accountability and recover national wealth will etch the contours of a technocrat-delivered utopia, he will have todeliver fast. For too long now accountability has been an euphemism for wielding power and cracking down on political opponents. The new dispensation must give early proof of a break from this past. Indeed, Musharraf8217;s problems have already begun, with Jamaat-e-Islami leader Qazi Hussain Ahmed rubbishing his new circle of advisers as tainted. And even as he squeezes defaulters, Musharraf will have to turn to the first item on his agenda: the economy. A 32 billion debt and measly foreign exchange make that next instalment of an IMF loan ever more dear. But the IMF8217;s assistance comes with a profusion of strings. Concerns over the future of democracy may be hushed by Western powers wary of driving generals armed with a nuclear arsenal to desperation, but the Fund is likely to insist on a hike in fuel and electricity prices. Other austerity measures are bound to follow. Balancing the need for painful economic restructuring and the desire to secure popular goodwill is difficult in the best of times. WillMusharraf8217;s military regime, accepted by the rest on account of the local support it enjoys, risk it? The longer he sticks around, the tougher it will get.

For India an extended bout in power for the choreographer of Kargil poses fresh foreign policy as well as internal security challenges. Engagement with the new dispensation is the only path ahead, no matter that forging confidence-building measures may entail a bit more give than take, a bit more caution than trust. But what of the US, to whom all of Musharraf8217;s pronouncements on Indo-Pak relations are addressed. Somehow Washington is getting factored into Islamabad-New Delhi relations. How will it utilise its leverage with the generals? Will it heed the protestations of foreign policy commentators like Gerald Segal, who point to the coup to underline the absurdity of the US according moral and strategic equivalence to India and Pakistan?