CIA inspector drops pre-poll bombshell

8216;8216;I still do not expect that militarily significant WMD stocks are cached in Iraq,8217;8217; Charles Duelfer, the CIA special adviser who led the hunt for weapons of mass destruction, said in testimony prepared for the Senate Armed Services Committee obtained by Reuters.

He said Iraq8217;s nuclear weapons programme had deteriorated since the 1991 Gulf War, but he said Saddam did not abandon his nuclear ambitions.

The issue has figured prominently in the campaign for the November 2 US presidential election, with Bush8217;s Democratic opponent John Kerry saying Bush rushed to war without allowing UN inspections enough time to check out Iraq8217;s armaments.

Bush, who has given varying justifications for the war, said in a speech in Pennsylvania on Wednesday that the concern was that terrorists would get banned weapons from Saddam.

8216;8216;There was a risk, a real risk, that Saddam would pass weapons or materials or information to terrorist networks,8217;8217; Bush said. 8216;8216;In the world after 9/11, that was a risk we could not afford to take,8217;8217; he said.

Duelfer said a risk that has emerged since he last briefed Congress on the status of the WMD hunt was a connection between chemical weapons experts from Saddam8217;s former regime with insurgents fighting the US-led forces now in Iraq.

8216;8216;I believe we got ahead of this problem through a series of raids throughout the spring and summer. I am convinced we successfully contained a problem before it matured into a major threat,8217;8217; Duelfer said.

8216;8216;Nevertheless, it points to the problem that the dangerous expertise developed by the previous regime could be transferred to other hands,8217;8217; he said.

Duelfer said that by the time of the war in 2003, Iraq would have been able to produce mustard agent in months and nerve agent in less than a year.

8216;8216;We have not come across explicit guidance from Saddam on this point, yet it was an inherent consequence of his decision to develop a domestic chemical production capacity,8217;8217; Duelfer said.

Duelfer said that 8216;8216;despite Saddam8217;s expressed desire to retain the knowledge of his nuclear team, and his attempts to retain some key parts of the programme after 1991, during the course of the following 12 years Iraq8217;s ability to produce a weapon decayed.8217;8217;

Duelfer briefed the Senate Intelligence Committee behind closed doors about his report in the morning and was to testify later at an open Senate Armed Services Committee hearing.

8216;8216;While it is clear that Saddam wanted a long-range missile, there was little work done on warheads. It is apparent that he drew the line at that point 8230; so long as sanctions remained,8217;8217; Duelfer said. One of Saddam8217;s priorities was to escape UN sanctions, he said. 8212;Reuters