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Journalism of Courage
The recent cover story on India in The Economist considered what was holding us back from realising the true growth potential. It concluded that the tardiness of officialdom was the big constraint and prescribed the need for downsizing and meaningful administrative reforms.
Interestingly, the article depicts a day in the lives of two district magistrates, one in Uttar Pradesh and the other in Kerala. Both are examples of harassed human beings overburdened by complex problems. The mammoth bureaucracy is perceived as impeding progress. However, field officers are overstretched looking at the enormity of local problems, a growing backlog of public grievances and meaningful monitoring of public outlays.
Action on devolution of administrative and financial powers to Panchayati Raj institutions, reforming local self-government, depoliticisation in matters of placement, promotion and seeking continuity of tenure has been ad hoc and half-hearted. However, consider the following:
8226;First, in a democratic fabric how genuinely can we depoliticise administration? Important administrative decisions have political overtones. In the higher echelons of administration, the distinction between politics and administration gets increasingly blurred. Elected political representatives at multiple levels, particularly to state legislatures and Parliament seek to serve the electorate. This may be at variance with the compulsions of a neutral bureaucracy. Excessive political interference detracts from overall public good. The rationale of permanent civil servants showing total neutrality and remaining outside the fabric of political decision is bit of a myth. Combining political necessities with good governance and adhering to best practices in managing the bureaucracy offer difficult options. There is a need to adopt a differentiated approach, given the vast differences in governance quality and levels of economic developments. A lot also depends on the milieu, the nature of the coalition and avoiding the danger of letting the best become an enemy of the good.
In a presidential system like the US, key officials come and go with the presidency. A system based largely on the spoils system could lead to instability, particularly in complex federal structures and an era of coalition politics. Yet, lateral inductions, particularly at middle and higher levels of responsibilities, both at the Centre and states, can combine invigoration with continuity. However, any contract appointments must have credibility and transparency.
8226;Second, the need to attract talent with domain knowledge raises issues of emoluments and compensation package. While a market-driven basket may be difficult, some halfway solution is necessary. It should be adequate to attract talent but not upset the rest of the system. Besides, permitting flexible policy for a two-way relationship between public and private employment could foster public private partnership, create trust and share responsibilities.
8226;Third, we are clearly expecting too much from district magistrates and field officials. They were primarily created under the British Administration for maintaining security to life and property, administering the law and collecting revenues. Expecting them to supervise large value and innumerable public outlays on anti-poverty schemes lies beyond their capability and time. Merely creating another District Development Officer does not help since the final responsibility will rest with the nodal district officials. We need to look for alternative agencies and models for implementing large and growing public outlays. Some 8216;out of the box8217; thinking is necessary. The NGOs and civil society have their limitations and may prove inadequate given the rising scale of public expenditure.
8226;Fourth, a number of quasi-independent regulatory institutions are being created. The selection of personnel and the hunt for talent remains skewed. Ministries hate to part with powers, permit independent selection of the most talented and remain wary of implementing their recommendations. An adequate compensation package is yet another issue. Equally important is the mindset problem 8212; regulators need to resolve disputes and not function excessively as judicial entities. A new regulatory culture has yet to take root.
8226;Finally, administrative reform has a broader connotation beyond civil service reform. It concerns the interface between the governance structure and the people. Issues like judicial, revenue and police reforms are integral to it, but so are financial, economic and fiscal issues. The new dynamics of an evolving Centre-state relationship need imaginative arrangements.
Administrative reforms have scarcely begun. They deserve priority and support across 8216;the political rainbow8217; if India is to realise its growth potential.
