Bordering on the weak

The Government of India’s response has been lackadaisical on both occasions, though it was a shade better this time. In 2001, the Minister for External Affairs made a statement on the floor of the Parliament after seven days, and the Home Secretary committed the indiscretion of giving a clean chit to the Bangladesh government, saying that it was ‘‘a unilateral action by the BDR troops’’. We were told that Hasina’s was a friendly government, that Bangladesh was going to have elections in the near future, and that it would be politically inexpedient to do anything which would prejudice her chances at the hustings. Ultimately, she lost in the elections and we got neither ‘Hasina nor Ram’. National honour was compromised in the process. In the present incident, the government reacted promptly and warned that ‘‘its repercussions could not be ignored’’. However, the Home Minister’s statement that India has asked Bangladesh to sustain a bilateral relationship wherein ‘‘we are not humiliated’’ was distressing. The emphasis is not on upholding national honour or prestige but only on not being humiliated. The Bangladesh government is learnt to have instituted an inquiry into the incident by a group of officers headed by a joint secretary. We should have insisted on a joint inquiry. The Bangladesh inquiry is bound to be partisan and its conclusions could be foretold – that the Assistant Commandant, BSF trespassed into Bangladesh, that he was apprehended in the process and that, on offering resistance, he got killed. In 2001, we never insisted on action being taken against the murderous BDR personnel.In 2005, we did not insist on a joint inquiry and are unlikely to press for action against the delinquent BDR men.The lives of the paramilitary personnel are obviously dispensable.

The Border Security Force also owes an explanation to the country for getting repeatedly bashed up by the BDR.There is something seriously wrong with the Force leadership in the eastern sector and the working ethos of its personnel. How could the BSF Assistant Commandant, who was accompanied by at least two other jawans, be overpowered and killed? Why could these jawans not retaliate? There seems to be too much a non-violent approach in their day to day working. The Government of India is also to blame for this culture.Every time a Bangladeshi is killed, there are inconvenient questions asked by Delhi.The government will have to give unambiguous instructions that infiltrators and smugglers should be warned and,if necessary, fired at.

The government must update its border management in the eastern sector. The fencing project should be accelerated notwithstanding the opposition from the BDR. The undefined part of the border, which is hardly 6.5 kilometers, should be got demarcated.There are 111 Indian enclaves covering more than 17,000 acres in Bangladesh and 51 Bangladesh enclaves covering more than 7,000 acres in India. This geographical absurdity must be sorted out. The recommendations of the Task Force on Border Management should be made public and fully implemented.

The three major problems on our eastern borders are: the massive infiltration from Bangladesh, the cross-border movements of different insurgent groups, and the trafficking in drugs and other contraband items. Successive governments have shown a singular lack of political will in dealing with the problem of demographic invasion.The government’s recent decision to continue with the IMDT act was deplorable; the Assamese intellectuals consider it a ‘Black Act’. It is also amazing that we furnish a list of about 190 terrorist camps in Bangladesh, but our neighbour denies the existence of even one.They must be made to acknowledge the ground realities.The volume of drug trafficking increases significantly on the Myanmar border.The government must conduct its relations with Bangladesh from a position of strength.

It is not suggested that we become hegemonist, as is frequently alleged, but national interests and national honour must be upheld under all circumstances irrespective of the government in Dhaka. After the 2001 incident, analyst Brahma Chellaney had remarked that ‘the question vexing the average Indian is that if the country cannot handle Bangladesh, how can it possibly manage the joint threat mounted by China and Pakistan’. The question comes back to haunt us four years later again.

The writer was former Director General of the Border Security Force