Border crossings

In Sri Lanka, last week saw the biggest and most blatant violation of the ceasefire agreement in place between Tamil separatists and the government in Colombo since 2002. As both sides embark on more frequent military actions and deaths in Sri Lanka mount, both Colombo and the international community have been pressing New Delhi to take a more active part in averting a breakdown of the peace process.

Nepal and Sri Lanka are not the only countries in the region demanding India8217;s attention. As two archrivals and former prime ministers of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, join hands against Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, India will be asked to show greater sensitivity to the democratic aspirations of the Pakistani people.

Despite the strong public rhetoric against India8217;s intervention, political elite in the region have always sought Delhi8217;s intervention on their behalf while resenting it in favour of their opponents.

In dealing with security crises in its neighbourhood, India had to constantly struggle to balance two principles 8212; the idea of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries and the imperative of preserving regional peace and stability.

Articulated in different forms since independence, the approach to regional security 8212; often called India8217;s Monroe Doctrine 8212; proclaims New Delhi8217;s responsibility to maintain peace and order in the neighbourhood. The flip side of this assertion of India8217;s regional primacy has been opposition to intervention by other great powers and the international community in the Subcontinent.

The cold war confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union and the ideological and political rivalry between China and Russia did have its negative consequences for South Asia, much to the unease of India in the past. Since the end of the cold war, these great power rivalries have largely subsided. Today all the great powers, including the US, China and Russia, have improving relations with all the nations of South Asia.

But internal conflicts in South Asia continue to simmer and occasionally boil over into civil wars. Amidst India8217;s increasing weight in the global affairs and the growing prospect of debilitating civil wars and potential failed states within the region, Delhi will indeed be called upon to contribute more actively to the security management in the region.

India has had a long tradition of military and political intervention in its own neighbourhood. These included the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 and involvement in the Sri Lankan civil war in the late 1980s, to name just two.

The latest Indian intervention was in Nepal. India got the political parties and the Maoist rebels onto the same platform last year and directly interceded with King Gyanendra last month to avoid blood shed and hand over power to the Nepali people.

In Sri Lanka, however, India8217;s remains reluctant to intervene. Thanks to the failed intervention in the past, New Delhi is hesitant to intervene in the renewed violent conflict between the Tamil separatists and the Sri Lankan government.

India, however, cannot sustain this position for too long. As the peace process begins to break down in Sri Lanka, neither Norway which has acted as a mediator nor Japan which is leading the international effort to help reconstruct the nation has the political clout to restrain the warring parties and compel them back to the negotiating table.

India will soon have no option to but intervene in Sri Lanka in some form or the other. The manner of Indian intervention would be more important than the fact of the inevitable Indian involvement in South Asian conflicts.

This is where India needs to reframe the Monroe Doctrine. To suggest that other powers and the international community should have no role in the Subcontinent8217;s conflicts would fly in the face of current global reality.

In some ways India has already adapted to the new circumstances. In both Nepal and Sri Lanka, India has allowed third parties some space in promoting peace processes. And this has had some benefits.

Working with the US, Britain and the European Union helped limit King Gyanendra8217;s options in Nepal. New Delhi8217;s decision to keep Beijing informed on its Nepal initiatives helped prevent any misperceptions in China, which shares a long border with Nepal.

In Sri Lanka, the initial involvement of Norway served India8217;s interests at a time when India was reluctant to directly intervene. Greater international involvement, however, is not a substitute to Indian leadership in regional conflict resolution.

India staying aloof from the peace process in Sri Lanka has not helped in any way. India now needs to prepare itself for a more direct role as well as build an international coalition to raise the pressure on both parties to see reason. Nor can India stay away from the incipient debate on democracy in Pakistan.

As India copes with internal turmoil in the Subcontinent, it needs to modify the Monroe Doctrine to read something like 8220;India-led security multilateralism8221; in the region. Under the Monroe Doctrine, India tended to vacillate between unilateral interventions when the much vaunted bilateralism with neighbours failed and a do-nothing policy. Instead, India in future must make its regional interventions smarter and more multilateral.

Rather than make either 8220;non-intervention8221; or 8220;unilateralism8221; high-minded principles, India should focus on outcomes that include retaining India8217;s primacy through multilateralism and a broader regional movement towards both democracy and prosperity.