Bad lessons in social engineering

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is reported to be deeply perturbed about the poor standards of higher education in the country...

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is reported to be deeply perturbed about the poor standards of higher education in the country IE, June 15. At the same time, the HRD ministry has compelled top colleges to enforce reservation for OBCs in faculty selections. Apparently, the government is chasing two objectives simultaneously 8212; quality in education and social engineering in faculty selection.

The two objectives are in conflict. Consider a simple example. For a teacher8217;s post there are two applicants. One is an upper caste, with excellent credentials, thanks to inherited advantage. The other is a first generation learner, badly handicapped by backward caste antecedents. Consequently, for no fault of his, he is less scholarly and less able. It is not improbable that the backward caste candidate would have been more proficient if he had had the same family background as the upper caste competitor. Hence, his lack of skills is not his own fault but that of his environment. Therefore, there is a strong case to prefer him to the more advantaged upper caste candidate. At the same time, consider the future of the students. Who will give them a stronger academic foundation 8212; the more able upper caste teacher or the handicapped backward caste one?

I raised this question to a group of college teachers who were attending a course in Delhi. Several of them were vociferous in demanding reservations in teaching posts and about the need to break upper caste dominance in the teaching profession. I then asked them to which school they will send their children 8212; a government school where teachers are selected on caste basis or a private one where teachers are appointed on merit. My question was met with thundering silence.

As matters stand, government policy generates a conflict of interest between one backward caste teacher, on the one hand, and a large number of children, on the other. Incidentally, most of those children will be from disadvantaged groups. Typically, a teacher influences 1000 to 2000 children in the course of their careers. Then, on balance, it should be fairer to select the more able teacher even if that means selecting one from a higher caste. Further, it should be politically more fruitful to provide better education to 1000 students than to patronise one backward class teacher. Apparently, what is so obvious is not politically expedient.

The HRD ministry has asked for Rs 77,779 crore to improve and expand education. In disbursing that large amount, the ministry had two choices: distribute the money among school managements or give it directly to needy students. When the government pays out its funds as scholarships, it will patronise much larger number of voters than when it hands the money to school managements. If the government moves further, and lets students choose which school they will attend, it will also create competition among schools. Then, it will get a double benefit: please a much larger number of voters and, at the same time, gain accolades for improving education. However, it is unthinkable that the government will choose this apparently superior option. It will almost definitely patronise the much fewer numbers that manage educational institutions and accept, too, the lower standards that will persist in the absence of competition.

There is a method in this apparent madness: in the experience of politicians, voters do not count; only vote-bankers do. Experience has shown 8212; as the recent Gurjjar agitation did 8212; that caste leaders can bring the administration to a halt. Dissatisfied students, in contrast, meekly opt out of bad schools. They create no fuss. Similarly, managers and heads of schools are politically influential; their students are not. Hence, politicians feel that it is wiser to patronise far fewer school

managers than the much larger number of students.

Thus, both in the case of teacher selections and in the case of financial patronage, politicians curry favour with a few influential vote-bankers and ignore much larger numbers of less vociferous voters. As a rule, vote-bank politics helps small pressure groups and decimates national parties. Afflicted as they are by logic-blindness, few politicians appreciate that fact. Even such a shrewd person as the HRD minister has not realised that his votebank politics has forced his party to commit hara-kiri. The fact that the BJP is no better is no consolation. One wonders how much more national parties should suffer before they realise that, for them, caste politics is a mug8217;s game.

The writer is a former director of IIT, Madras