After the NSG

India8217;s self-referential internal debates generally prevent New Delhi from appreciating how other nations see its moves and anticipating how they might respond to its actions. Take for example, India8217;s affirmation in May 1974, when it declared that its first nuclear test was a 8216;peaceful nuclear explosion8217;.

The rest of the world viewed it as a demonstration of India8217;s nuclear weapon capability. Although India did not proceed down the road of nuclear weaponisation for many years after Pokharan I, the world saw India as a proliferation threat and mounted a technology denial regime against it. Beijing saw Pokharan I as part of India8217;s determination to consolidate its 8216;hegemony8217; in South Asia after its decisive military intervention to divide Pakistan in 1971.

Strengthening Pakistan to prevent India8217;s dominance of South Asia became China8217;s immediate strategic objective in 1974. As a result, China assisted Pakistan8217;s nuclear and missile programmes. New Delhi8217;s failure to anticipate Beijing8217;s reaction after Pokharan I turned out to be costly for the nation.

Indo-Pak parity

After Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and US President George W. Bush unveiled the nuclear deal in July 2005, the initial Chinese reactions were indeed focused on getting Pakistan a similar deal. That objective remained in play right until the very end of NSG8217;s extended deliberations.

If Islamabad was not in such a bad shape, as it is today, Beijing would have had a lot more room to either sustain Indo-Pak parity or deny the international acceptance of India8217;s nuclear exceptionalism. Having failed to achieve either, Beijing8217;s real concern, it is not unreasonable to assume, might be about the changing balance of power between India and Pakistan.

Without an NSG approval, which is all but impossible, Beijing cannot match the Indo-US deal with a similar Sino-Pak civil nuclear initiative. Having become part of the NPT, China cannot legally assist in the expansion of Pakistan8217;s nuclear weapons programme either. Legal assistance which might be possible in the missile arena is unlikely to alter the military balance between India and Pakistan. That might leave China with two options: one is to accept the impossibility of sustaining Pakistan8217;s parity with India; the other is to extend its nuclear umbrella over Pakistan.

Asian balance

Unlike in the 1970s, when Beijing saw Pokharan I in purely South Asian terms, China8217;s current objections to the Indo-US nuclear deal are rooted in concerns about the wider Asian balance of power. Since July 2005, China suspected that the US-India deal was less about nuclear issues and more about building New Delhi as a counter-weight to Beijing.

While commentary in the Chinese press has often alluded to these concerns, Beijing appears to have underestimated President Bush8217;s political commitment to the India deal and overestimated the ability of the smaller European states to scuttle India8217;s nuclear liberation.

That Bush8217;s phone call to Chinese President Hu Jintao left no room for Beijing in the NSG should underline one important reality to New Delhi 8212; for all its proclamation of friendship with China, New Delhi has less political leverage with Beijing than Washington.

If India absorbs that realism, it will be better placed to deal with Beijing8217;s likely moves to balance India8217;s traditional weight in the subcontinent and constrain its search for a greater influence in East Asia.

As a first step India must discard the expansive rhetoric of the past on Asian solidarity and global multipolarity in its engagement with Chinese leaders and focus on practical solutions to long-standing bilateral problems, such as the boundary dispute. New Delhi must make it clear that it will not play second fiddle to either Washington or Beijing, and that neither will have a veto over its relationship with the other.

If China is prepared to deal with India as an equal, New Delhi should have no problem in building a relationship of mutual benefit. If Beijing is not, India is better equipped than ever before to play the balancing game in Asia.

The writer is a Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. iscrmohanntu.edu.sg