Revolutions in military affairs have been a function of emerging technologies of the time -- from gunpowder and the steam engine to recent revolutions brought about by Information and Communications Technology. Warfare in the realm of high-tech tries to minimise human interface. Yet, recent incidents have been revealing. The ongoing conflict in Middle East, the tactics Hamas used against Israeli Defence Forces to evade detection and infiltration through underground tunnels is low-grade tech used effectively. This shows that even in today’s digital age, militaries need to be prepared to fight analogue wars — without relying on state-of-the-art technology. Limitations of high-grade military tech The premise for going high-tech is that machines will eliminate human error and make warfare more efficient. Today’s machines and equipment have advanced algorithms, but you still need somebody to switch on the device, press a few controls and run checks to ensure the machine’s fitness, that it operates as it is designed to. Technology is alluring. All armed forces wish to possess and operate state-of-the-art equipment and weaponry if budgets allow. Super-computing, AI, machine learning and modern networking technologies are driving the current revolution in military affairs. Almost every modern device comprises electronics, computers, coding and networks. By their very nature, they lack robustness. Military use requires ‘hardening’. Equipment must be robust enough to withstand extremes of weather, shock from vibrations or explosions and waterproofing among other features. These cost a fortune. As a trade-off, compromises are made, which result in a lack of reliability and failures. This can prove costly in war. Another serious problem with network, computers and software-heavy systems is that the entire system is rarely owned exclusively by the armed force in question. This creates unacceptable dependency on external agencies, Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), who provide customised hardware and software integrators. For repairs, specialised diagnostic tools are often not available with the fighting unit, but with these agencies. These devices and networks are susceptible to disruption – a GPS denial will affect everything from navigation to weapon delivery. Efficient and maintainable electro-hydraulic steering systems of ships have given way to complicated microprocessor-based controllers susceptible to failure. By replacing the ‘Captain of the Turret’, the operator who would sit inside a gun mounting, with a computerised fire control, we’ve lost the ability to fire the gun at will. Technology in warfare is fine so long it is your own, robust, reliable, self-contained, integrally maintainable and affordable. Otherwise, it can create more vulnerabilities than advantages. Unprepared for analogue war? In ‘US Naval Proceedings’ of April 2018, Jonathan Panter suggested the US Navy may be unprepared for an ‘analogue’ war for precisely these downsides of technology. The Indian experience should make us think similarly. Technology is aggressively peddled in the international defence industry, often adopted just because it is state-of-the-art and not for any real need. Militaries of countries without own technologies get what is given – the decision- making, based on multiple factors, is not always rational. Adopting technology also drives the training of human resource. For instance, Indian Navy chose to train all its officers as engineers in the mid-1990s as it was felt that non-engineers would be misfits in the 21st century Navy. The jury is still out whether this was a sound decision. Moreover, induction of high-tech equipment/ systems takes us away from the fundamentals. Focus of training syllabi shifts to operating these gadgets; and to concepts such as maintainer-operator models of skilling. Studies have indicated this compromises both operator and maintainer training. Overall training time already stands reduced, the argument being that modern training methods require lesser contact. What gets slashed? The basics. To illustrate, the understanding and practice of astro-navigation has become practically zero with the advent of GPS. Electronic navigation has marginalised basic terrestrial navigation. Modern digicomm systems have replaced highly reliable operator-based traditional methods. Simultaneously, electronic signatures of fighting forces have increased, making them more susceptible to interception. Asymmetry here to stay More than ever before, conflicts have become asymmetric. Earlier, the asymmetry was a function of capability and wealth when wars were fought in conventional domains. Today, conflict domains include space, cyber and information, through which adversaries can be targeted without firing a shot. Conventional warfare is still possible, as we’re witnessing between Russia and Ukraine. But trends indicate modern warfare will exploit digital vulnerabilities as well as use rustic, unexpected means to achieve surprise. For instance, Chinese soldiers used sticks, stones and barbed wires in the 2020 Galwan clash, taking Indians by surprise. The latter fought back and inflicted humiliating casualties on the Chinese. China lasing pilots of an Australian reconnaissance aircraft recently, its dangerous manoeuvres against warships of other countries in the South China Sea, its use of sonars to injure divers under water among other activities in the ‘grey zone’ have been anything but high-tech. A rethink is in order There is a need to rethink the way we conduct the business of warfare. The approach of adversaries to military engagement will vary below and above the threshold of conventional warfare. Technology will continue to be attractive, but its limitations must be appreciated. Simplicity, robustness, security and reliability are often at conflict with modern technology. Once deployed in conflict, all umbilicals with support agencies must be cut. The armed forces must retain the ability to fight without depending on a laptop-wielding OEM representative on the battlefield. We must expect and prepare for the range of options, from sticks and stones to strategic deterrence. The author is a former Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command
