MR Sharan Explains: Nitish Kumar’s survey and history of caste churn in Bihar

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

What was the caste landscape in Bihar like historically?

Historically speaking, Bhumihars, Brahmins, Rajputs and Lalas (Kayasthas) have together dominated Bihar’s political and caste landscape. They were the major landowners, and until the 1970s, their dominance was largely unchallenged. Most prominent Bihari leaders till date have come from either these four castes, or from the “powerful backwards” — comprising the numerically sizable castes of the Yadavs, Koeris (Kushwahas), and Kurmis.

What changed in the late 1970s?

First, a backward caste (Nai) leader called Karpoori Thakur (1924-88) became Chief Minister in June 1977. (He was in the post for a few months earlier in 1970-71.) This can be seen as a culmination of a process that began in the late 1960s, when, for the first time, a large number of backward caste members entered the Bihar Vidhan Sabha. In 1978, Thakur implemented, for the first time, a model of layered reservation, in which a 26% quota was divided into 12% for backwards, 8% for the poor among the backwards, 3% for women, and 3% for the “upper caste” poor. Thakur is considered to be the mentor of Lalu Prasad and Nitish Kumar.

Second, the movement led by Jayaprakash (JP) Narayan (1902-79) catalysed the arrival of charismatic student leaders — Lalu, Nitish, Ram Vilas Paswan, Sushil Kumar Modi, Ravi Shankar Prasad — who would go on to reshape the politics of Bihar in the 90s.

What role did Lalu have in the story of caste in Bihar?

The arrival of Lalu in the 1990s was a seminal moment for caste relations. He directly challenged the political power of the four “upper” castes; his provocative slogan was “Bhura baal (Bhumihar-Rajput-Brahman-Lala) saaf karo”.

Anthropologist Jeffrey L Witsoe argued that Lalu transformed caste relationships by challenging the entrenched power of the upper castes in the bureaucracy and all elite domains, and empowering local elected leaders, often from the backward castes or Muslims. Yadav’s rule created historic social churning and, in many places, transformed the social relations between backward and upper castes. However, he “prioritised democracy over development”, Witsoe said, which meant that the state as a whole may have suffered in some ways.

The 1990s saw a collapse of law and order, and massive corruption, and, while the rest of the country was beginning to grow quickly, Bihar stagnated as a whole. The Lalu years were the fire that scorched the caste society of Bihar, but one could argue it burnt parts of the forest down too.

How did the implementation of the Mandal Commission report impact caste consciousness?

In Bihar, even today and much more 40 years ago, a government job was the lottery ticket to progress for most families. It was hoped that reservations would fundamentally transform the lives of many.

The Mandal recommendations further strengthened the already strong caste consciousness among the OBCs. Someone like Karpoori Thakur was a big leader long before the Mandal discourse even began, and the student leaders from backward castes were already influential by the time Mandal came. What Mandal also managed to do was to solidify the bonds between the upper-castes as they came together to oppose the reservations.

How did things change with Nitish?

Nitish understood that Yadavs and Muslims were firmly with Lalu, but upper castes, Dalits, and lower backwards (EBCs) could be wooed for votes. So he brought in policies to target the EBCs and a section of Dalits. For instance, for the first time in Bihar’s history, he implemented reservation in local political positions, not just for women and Dalits, but also for the EBCs — backwards who have now emerged as the most populous caste group in the caste survey — and brought targeted policies for this group.

He also understood that within the Scheduled Caste groups, a few were better off than the rest — the Paswans, for instance, were historically bodyguards of powerful landlords, and shared a reasonably good relationship with the feudal powers, but this was not the case for lower Dalits such as Majhis or Doms. So he carved out a separate “Mahadalit” group from the Dalits, created a Mahadalit Vikas Mission in 2007 and pushed a separate set of policies that discriminated in favour of these Dalit groups. When it came to picking a successor, Nitish Kumar and the JDU picked Jitan Ram Manjhi as the first Mahadalit Chief Minister of Bihar for nine months in 2014-15.

II. EBCs AND CASTE SURVEY

How do EBCs differ from other OBCs?

Extremely Backward Classes are the most populous caste group in Bihar — 36% — as per the recent survey. The fundamental disparity between them and the powerful backwards is with regard to land ownership, which puts them at a major disadvantage.

The bottom jatis in terms of asset ownership in the Socio-Economic and Caste Census (SECC) of 2011 are all Dalits, but many of the jatis immediately above them are EBCs. So not only are EBCs lower than other OBCs in the land-owning and caste hierarchies, but even in the wealth hierarchy, they are near the bottom.

Since OBC reservations is a single category, a lot of the benefit is garnered by the powerful backwards who, according to the survey, constitute 27% of the state’s population, significantly less than the EBCs. Nitish and Karpoori Thakur recognised this and introduced targeted policies, now there are numbers to back that assessment.

If the layers within the OBCs have been known since the 1970s, how does just having numbers help?

EBCs are fundamentally different from the powerful backwards, and putting them in the amorphous OBC category does them a big disservice as they remain at the bottom of the hierarchy. It is the same with the Dalits and Mahadalits. If some groups require more help than others, it is crucial to have data on them — at the very least, it allows the groups to make legitimate claims for themselves.

Our work in Bihar has shown that having a Dalit Panchayat president significantly improves outcomes — from asset ownership to political participation — for Dalit members in the community in the long run. Bihar has more than 130 million people and, if it were a country, it would be the 10th largest in the world. The backwards and EBCs are 27% and 36% of this large mass of people — from a global perspective, we might be talking about whole countries. For instance, EBCs in Bihar alone are four times the population of Sweden.

Also, the survey could also help us understand how caste functions within Muslim society, in addition to shedding light on the relative well-being of Muslims vis-a-vis Hindus.

How does having data translate to better-designed policies on the ground?

Here is an example, staying with local governance: reservations for Dalits for the post of Panchayat mukhiya (president) is based on the proportion of Dalits in a particular block (comprising 15 Gram Panchayats). If 20% of people in a block are Dalits, 20% of GP mukhiyas will be Dalit as well. While there has been similar reservation for EBCs at the Panchayat level, the proportion of EBCs in a block was not known — so the government made a rule that up to 20% of seats can be reserved for EBCs.

Now, with this survey, the government has granular jati data at a very fine geographical level, and the caste survey can rationalise policies such as this. And such policies can have serious knock-on effects on governance down the line.

So the data are known, what happens now?

Beyond parties making claims for more reservation, it is unlikely much will change in the short term. The government will need to spend time number-crunching and designing policies before we see well-tailored programmes on the ground. Nothing dramatic should be expected before, at the earliest, the Lok Sabha elections next year.

Also, all this is conditional on the data being good — and we have no idea about that yet — and the government having the political will and administrative nous to follow through. Not much is known about the specifics of how the data were collected and rationalised, etc.

Critics have said the survey results will lead to intensified jockeying for reservations and potentially social turmoil.

If the data allow certain jatis who are extra marginalised within a marginalised population to make legitimate claims for their rights, I am all for it.

Also, I am not sure jostling for reservations is necessarily bad for society. A lot of jostling is already happening at the baseline. And if reservations do cross the 50% mark (as prescribed by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney), that may not necessarily be a bad thing. Tamil Nadu has reservations for up to 70% of the population and it is not going through turmoil as a consequence.

III. POLITICS AND IMPLICATIONS

What was the need to have this survey — and in Bihar specifically?

The survey was proposed by the JD(U), and part of the reason was it needed some rejuvenation.

Nitish does not have a strong caste base — even this survey shows that his caste, Kurmis, are under 3% of the population. He needs more castes to rally behind him, and the cynical view is the survey was born out of Nitish’s personal politics.

But also, the proponents of the survey — Nitish and Lalu — emerged from the JP movement, and their politics can be traced back farther to the socialism of Ram Manohar Lohia, whose social justice polemics would argue for better enumeration and therefore better representation of castes.

The SECC data, gathered at the national level, was not released for various reasons. But the Indian government has considered obtaining jati data at the local level for at least three decades now.

On why Bihar rather than, say, Uttar Pradesh — maybe it is just that Lalu and Nitish are now together and can push for something they agree on. Maybe if Nitish was still with the BJP, things would be different. But there is no way to say for sure. Bihar does have a history of powerful backwards in politics in a way that UP does not, though.

Why is BJP leadership opposed to the survey?

The BJP’s position is guided by its goal of maintaining Hindu unity, and it would be opposed to anything with the potential to divide Hindus. One of the reasons behind Narendra Modi’s electoral success is the consolidation of the Hindu vote — which means that he has managed to make OBCs and Dalits vote for the BJP as Hindus first, rather than as members of their castes.

It is important to underline though that the opposition to the survey comes from the central BJP, not the party’s Bihar unit. The BJP in Bihar has a much broader base, with many EBCs within the party fold and Dalis offering support too.

Could this be a Mandal 2.0 moment as some JD(U) and RJD leaders have claimed?

The survey results will act as a driver for the kind of politics these parties have always done. The data, if it is any good, will add weight and strength to their demands, and will help them make targeted policies for their base. Most parties in the INDIA alliance will make demands for the backwards.

And yet, it may not be a gamechanger, especially for the coming elections. The invocation of Mandal is purely political. But it can definitely be the starting point for something bigger in the longer run.

Mandal was transformational because it, for the first time, took an entire mass of people and recognised their marginal position and gave them reservations. Anything that comes next will build on top of it and hence bring marginal change. The caste survey is great for policy and for a certain kind of politics, but comparing it to Mandal misses just how enormous Mandal itself was for the country.

MR Sharan is an Assistant Professor teaching economics at the University of Maryland, College Park. His research, mostly set in Bihar, focuses on local governments, with an emphasis on policy innovations that could empower marginalised groups. His book on Bihar, titled ‘Last Among Equals: Power, Caste and Politics in Bihar’s Villages’ was released in December 2021.