Trump, Syria & the Middle East: What the US President wants

This was followed by an unprecedented meeting between the US President and the de facto President of Syria Ahmad al-Sharaa, in the presence of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan joined via telephone.

US sanctions on Syria have been in place for 46 years – since Syria was first designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1979.

In 2017, the US had put a bounty on the head of Al-Sharaa who, known by his nom de guerre Abu Muhammad al-Golani, was described as a “senior leader” of the Al-Nusrah Front, “Al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria”, and was described as being responsible for “multiple terrorist attacks throughout Syria, often targeting civilians.”

This bounty was lifted on December 20 last year – after Al-Sharaa had ousted President Bashar al-Assad and taken control of Syria. His meteoric regional rise, with help from Qatar and Turkey, was not unexpected – but what explains the dramatic turnaround by the US?

The US and Syria

The US sanctions against Syria have included embargoes on arms sales and foreign assistance restrictions since 1979 (for Syria’s support to Palestinian and Lebanese anti-Israel armed groups), and increased restrictions on arms sales and financial engagements since 2004 (for continued support to anti-Israel armed groups and its occupation of Lebanon).

After 2011, following mass violations of human rights by the erstwhile regime, the US sanctions went from being ‘targeted’ to ‘comprehensive’, and Assad himself, and entities linked to him, were sanctioned. Economic sanctions, including on Syrian petroleum, isolated Syria from the global financial system. By 2019, Congress had passed the Caesar Act, which sanctioned entities accused of human rights abuses.

Trump has declared that he will be “taking them all off”. Sanctions imposed by presidential executive orders can be revoked unilaterally; others will require Congressional action.

There are two key aspects to Trump’s decision.

FIRST, Assad’s exit created an obvious trigger for the lifting of sanctions that were linked with his family’s regime, regardless of the nature of its successor.

The Biden administration had already lifted some restrictions on humanitarian aid in January, and the European Union and United Kingdom lifted a range of sanctions on Syrian banking, energy, and transportation by May.

Syria’s economic losses due to the civil war (2011-24) amount to about $800 billion (at 2010 prices), the United Nations Development Program estimated in February, making the lifting of sanctions a vital requirement for rebuilding the country.

Al-Sharaa’s “transitional administration” has helped by adopting a conciliatory and moderate position in a deeply sectarian society domestically – and an engagement-friendly posture deliberately stripped of any Islamist/ ideological associations internationally.

He has also succeeded thus far in uniting Syria, and integrating its sectarian militias with the armed forces of the state.

With this positive internal political trajectory in Syria, it has become easier for countries to remove external instruments of pressure – which were originally intended to generate precisely such a domestic trajectory.

SECOND is Trump’s preference for regionally-owned processes for conflict resolution, and a reduction in America’s commitment to Middle Eastern security – for long evident in his inclination to withdraw US military personnel from both Syria and Iraq.

Trump made no proactive American commitment towards Syria’s economic future. Rather, as the White House’s statement shows, he called on Al-Sharaa to sign the Abraham Accords and recognise Israel, remove or deport foreign and “Palestinian” terrorists, aid the US in preventing the resurgence of ISIS, and assume responsibility for ISIS detention centres in Northeast Syria.

The fact that Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi have committed significant resources for Syria’s reconstruction and political stability, increases the US incentive to cede more agency to these regional actors.

Al-Sharaa’s past as an al-Qaeda leader matters little to Trump – who asserted in Riyadh that “far too many American Presidents have been afflicted” with the need to “look into the souls of foreign leaders” and “dispense justice for their sins”.

His job, Trump said, is “to promote the fundamental interests of stability, prosperity, and peace” – read trade deals.

The focus on trade

Trump’s inclination to lift sanctions on Syria was helped in large part by the trade-focused approach that the Gulf states have adopted in dealing with his administration.

The President’s seeming view of trade as the panacea for all conflict has dovetailed with the Gulf states’ own focus on economic diversification across geopolitical lines.

During Trump’s Middle East visit, the US has signed multi-sectoral deals worth $600 billion with Saudi Arabia (including a $142 billion arms deal, the biggest such agreement in US history), $243.5 billion with Qatar, and $200 billion with the UAE. All these states have committed to investing billions of dollars in the United States.

Doha, which maintains a more independent stance in the Gulf’s foreign policy, has chosen to pander to Trump personally – the President will accept a gift of a $400-million Boeing 747-8 for use as Air Force One, and Qatar will host its first Trump-branded real estate projects.

Riyadh, which feted Trump extravagantly, seeks to extract the maximum gains from the alignment in the visions of MBS – whose futuristic projects require advanced technologies – and key Trump allies such as Elon Musk (who accompanied Trump). Musk has already approved the use of his Starlink satellite Internet in the Saudi maritime and aviation sectors.

The US and Israel

Trump’s trade interests in the Middle East would appear to supersede the sensitivities of even close US allies such as Israel.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has opposed the rescinding of sanctions on Syria, and has sought to deter the US from increasing cooperation with Turkey.

Seemingly ignoring these concerns, the US on May 15 approved a $304-million missile deal with Turkey, and is working with Ankara to restore Turkish participation in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program.

The first Trump administration (2017-21) had removed Turkey from the program after Ankara’s decision to purchase the S-400 air defence system from Russia, and US defence officials continue to worry about the Russian system potentially collecting sensitive data from the F-35.

More importantly for Israel, the US is inching closer to a nuclear deal with Iran.

In Doha, Trump declared that the US and Iran were “getting close to maybe doing a deal” since Tehran has “sort of agreed to the terms”. And Ali Shamkhani, Political Advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader, asserted on May 15 that Tehran was ready to give up its enriched uranium should its own conditions be met.

While a final outcome on its negotiations with the US remains pending, it is already evident that Iran has succeeded in using the Yemen-based Houthis as a successful bargaining chip.

On May 6, the US declared a halt to Operation Rough Rider, its bombing campaign since March, in return for a cessation of attacks on US shipping by the Iran-backed militia. The Houthis did not commit to halting attacks against Israel, and Netanyahu declared that Israel would defend itself “alone”.

Bashir Ali Abbas is a Senior Research Associate at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi