C Raja Mohan writes: India-Bhutan ties show how to get it right in a challenging neighbourhood

Beyond the ceremonial warmth and the unveiling of new projects, Modi’s two-day trip invites reflection on how this exceptional relationship evolved, how it was modernised in 2007, and what lessons it offers for India’s wider neighbourhood diplomacy.

The framework of modern India-Bhutan relations was laid in the 1949 Treaty of Friendship, which reflected the geopolitical realities of the time. Independent India had inherited the British colonial structure of protectorates and buffer states tied to the Raj. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru essentially continued that approach when he signed security treaties with the three Himalayan states — Bhutan, Nepal, and Sikkim — during 1949-50.

Under the 1949 treaty, Bhutan agreed to be “guided by India” in the conduct of its external affairs, while India promised not to interfere in the internal affairs of Bhutan. This framework, however, became increasingly unsustainable amid the rise of nationalism in the Himalayan states, the weakening of India’s relative power, and the inevitable intrusion of other global powers — the United States, the Soviet Union, and China.

The protectorate model collapsed eventually: Nepal disregarded many treaty provisions, and Delhi incorporated Sikkim into the Indian Union. Bhutan, however, managed the transition with remarkable suppleness. It steadily expanded its strategic autonomy without locking itself into persistent confrontation with Delhi, as Nepal did, or being absorbed by India, like Sikkim.

The maturity of leadership in both capitals and their recognition of the shared strategic stakes ensured broad political stability. India helped Bhutan build its administrative institutions, train its armed forces, and develop its economy. Hydropower cooperation, launched in the 1960s, became the central pillar of Bhutan’s growth and the symbol of a mutually beneficial economic partnership. Delhi, in turn, learnt to resist the temptation to deal with Thimphu with a heavy hand.

During this visit, Modi will join celebrations marking the 70th birthday of Jigme Singye Wangchuck, the fourth King of Bhutan — His Majesty the Fourth Druk Gyalpo, or K-4 — who deserves much of the credit for stabilising the relationship amid profound regional change during his long reign from 1972 to 2006. His abdication in 2006 and the transformation of the hereditary monarchy into a constitutional one ushered in Bhutan’s democratic transition. His son, King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, the K-5, now presides over Bhutanese democracy.

Delhi, for its part, recognised the need to recalibrate ties to match Bhutan’s domestic evolution and changing global conditions. The end of the Cold War, Bhutan’s democratic turn, and its growing international engagement demanded a relationship grounded in sovereign equality.

The landmark revision of the 1949 treaty in 2007 provided that new basis. The most consequential change was the deletion of the clause requiring Bhutan to be “guided” by India in foreign affairs. The new text instead affirmed “mutual respect for each other’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity”. They also agreed not to let their territories be used against the other.

This shift acknowledged Bhutan’s pursuit of an independent foreign policy while retaining close security and developmental cooperation with India. It was an act of strategic confidence by Delhi and of political wisdom by Thimphu. Yet the 2007 treaty did not lessen the need for India to continually tend this partnership amid shifting regional and global dynamics — none more consequential than China’s rise as a Himalayan and global power.

Like all India’s neighbours, Bhutan is navigating a strategic landscape transformed by China’s ascent. Sharing a long and disputed border with China and occupying a sensitive location in the eastern Himalayas, Bhutan faces unique challenges. Thimphu has no formal diplomatic ties with Beijing, but the two sides hold regular consultations to resolve their boundary dispute. The Doklam plateau — the scene of the 2017 India-China standoff — remains a critical flashpoint. Bhutan’s approach has been cautious and deliberate: it seeks a peaceful boundary settlement while ensuring that no external power compromises its sovereignty or India’s vital security interests.

At the same time, Bhutan has broadened its diplomatic and economic horizons. It has cultivated partnerships with Japan, South Korea, and several European nations, and is expanding its presence in multilateral forums. Yet, even as Thimphu diversifies, it has deepened ties with Delhi — through new hydropower projects, cross-border railway links, digital initiatives, and educational cooperation.

India’s experience with Bhutan offers valuable lessons for managing asymmetric relationships— an enduring challenge in South Asia, where size disparities are vast. The essence of the Bhutan model lies in emphasising sovereign equality while sustaining a special partnership. Delhi’s restraint and respect for Bhutan’s choices, combined with Thimphu’s pragmatism and trust, have made this relationship uniquely durable.

In a region often defined by mistrust and imbalance, India’s relationship with Bhutan shows that asymmetry need not produce antagonism. The first lesson is that sustained development cooperation — rooted in transparency and local priorities — builds enduring goodwill. The second is that security cooperation works best when it is mutually beneficial rather than imposed. Third, resolving disputes where possible and managing them sensibly when they can’t is critical to avoid the poisoning of bilateral relations. And finally, strengthening the shared culture provides depth to bilateral relations.

The writer is a contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express and visiting research professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore